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JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN SCIENCE  
AND THE HUMANITIES 
DAN PRIEL

 
ABSTRACT 
For a long time philosophy has been unique among the humanities for 
seeking closer alliance with the sciences. In this Article I examine the 
place of science in relation to legal positivism. I argue that, historically, 
legal positivism has been advanced by theorists who were also positivists 
in the sense the term is used in the philosophy of social science: they were 
committed to the idea that the explanation of social phenomena should be 
conducted using similar methods to those used in the natural sciences. I 
then argue that since around 1960 jurisprudence, and legal positivism in 
particular, has undergone change toward anti-positivism. Central to this 
trend has been the idea that proper jurisprudential inquiry must be 
conducted from the ―internal point of view.‖ This view amounted to an 
attempt to combine a scientific-like aim of neutral description with a 
humanistic method of inquiry. It thus did not entirely abandon its links 
with scientific inquiry, but it has radically changed their nature. I show 
that this stance has had a negative impact of narrowing both the range of 
issues discussed and the kind of method considered appropriate for 
discussing these questions. I then argue that to counter these isolationist 
trends jurisprudence would benefit from reorientation of its midway 
position between science and the humanities in the opposite direction: its 
aims should be those traditionally associated with the humanities but it 
should try to bring new insight to these questions with a methodology 
much closer to that of the sciences.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1959 C.P. Snow published a book and coined a phrase. A scientist 
turned novelist, Snow felt at home in both the arts and the sciences. Based 
on his acquaintance with ideas and people of both camps, he argued that 
there was a growing chasm driving them apart: ―constantly I felt I was 
moving among two groups . . . who had almost ceased to communicate at 
all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in 
common that instead of going from Burlington House or South 
Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean.‖1 In the years 
that followed, matters only worsened, and they reached a nadir in the 
1990s when humanists published articles denouncing scientists for holding 
naїvely to a discredited model of objective reality, and scientists in turn 
denounced humanities work as intellectually worthless.
2
 And though the 
air seems calmer now, it is hard to say that there is much debate between 
the two cultures. Different subject matters, different methodologies, and 
increased specialization make such conversation all too difficult. 
 
 
 1. CHARLES PERCY SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES 2 (Canto ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) 
(1959). Burlington House is the location of five scientific learned societies; Kensington and Chelsea 
are neighborhoods associated with the London literati. 
 2. See PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND 
ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: 
POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS‘ ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998). 
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For a long time philosophy has stood in a rather awkward position 
between science and the humanities. In university departmental divisions, 
in bookstores, and, I think, in popular opinion, philosophy is (still) almost 
invariably classified among the humanities. But if one looks a bit more 
closely, the impression is quite different. For example, in debates 
surrounding Derridean deconstruction, most ―analytic‖ philosophers were 
critical of what two prominent philosophers described as the ―the sloppy 
and naive quality of what passes for philosophical argument in cultural 
studies . . . .‖3 Perhaps wary of what they perceived as the ―anything goes‖ 
feel of work in some quarters of the humanities, philosophers sought to 
imitate the methods of scientists with a style of argumentation that is more 
reminiscent of the sciences. Philosophical arguments often are advanced 
using formal languages, and, even when not, precision and clarity are very 
highly prized.
4
 A philosophical article often aims to show that certain 
conclusions do (or do not) follow deductively from certain premises. Even 
the ―testing‖ of philosophical ideas bear some resemblances to scientific 
method: a philosophical thesis is subjected to the philosophical 
community‘s ―replication‖ in the philosophical labs known as seminar 
rooms, where attempts are made at refuting it by means of 
counterexamples. If too many counterexamples are found, the thesis is 
rejected. 
The links and similarities do not end here. The wide currency of some 
views—such as monism in the philosophy of mind and physicalism in 
metaphysics—is in part the result of certain scientific discoveries. And 
philosophers have been drawing heavily on science in many other areas of 
philosophy as well. As for the future, many philosophers believe that the 
answers to some old philosophical chestnuts depend, to varying degrees, 
on future advances in science, not philosophy. Most prominently in the 
philosophy of mind, but also in areas such as ethics and philosophy of 
action, there are now voices arguing that many of the questions with which 
philosophers have been struggling for centuries are in fact empirical 
questions, and that they will ultimately be answered by the empirical 
methods of science. 
It would be wrong, however, to think that this is the whole story. There 
are other philosophers who argue that the philosophical enchantment with 
 
 
 3. Paul Boghossian & Thomas Nagel, Letter to the Editor, LINGUA FRANCA, July–Aug. 1996, 
available at http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9607/tsh.html (last visited May 30, 2012); see also 
John R. Searle, Literary Theory and Its Discontents, 25 NEW LITERARY HIST. 637 (1994). 
 4. For similar observations, see John R. Searle, The Future of Philosophy, 354 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL SOC‘Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 2069, 2071 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
272 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:269 
 
 
 
 
science is a mistake and that the appropriate location of philosophy and 
the appropriate way of doing philosophy should remain firmly within the 
humanities. Like their fellow philosophers, these writers strive for clarity 
and precision in argument, but they consider it a mistake to confuse clarity 
of expression with scientific aims. The reason has to do with perspective: 
on this view, philosophy, like the rest of the humanities, looks at events 
from the human perspective, and aims to explain the world from that 
perspective.
5
  
In one form at least, this debate among philosophers will be familiar to 
legal philosophers, as it is very closely connected to the distinction 
between the ―internal‖ and the ―external‖ points of view introduced into 
jurisprudence by H.L.A. Hart.
6
 Much has been written on the internal 
point of view, on what Hart meant by this term, on the significance of the 
internal point of view to his work, and on its relevance to jurisprudence 
more generally. But not much has been said on where the distinction 
between the internal and the external points of view places jurisprudence 
in the debate between the humanistic and scientific cultures. The purpose 
of this Article is to explore these issues. Even though Hart‘s use of these 
terms is not very clear,
7
 at their core is the distinction between humanistic 
understanding and scientific explanation of human behavior.
8
  
The place of legal philosophy or analytic jurisprudence (I use these 
terms interchangeably) in relation to science and the humanities is an 
important subject to explore for at least three reasons. First, contemporary 
jurisprudential debates should be connected to the history of the subject. 
Contemporary analytic jurisprudence is strongly a-historical—both in the 
sense that it cares little for the role of history and tradition within law, and 
in the little interest many of its proponents display for the history of 
jurisprudence itself.
9
 This is unfortunate because it leads to excessive 
focus on the work of a few recent writers at the expense of their 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, PHILOSOPHY AS A HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINE 204–06 (A. W. 
Moore ed., 2006) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, HUMANISTIC DISCIPLINE]; see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY, at v–vi (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ETHICS]. 
 6. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, CONCEPT 
OF LAW]. 
 7. See, e.g., John D. Hodson, Hart on the Internal Aspect of Rules, 62 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- 
UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 381, 382–88 (1976); Frederick A. Siegler, Hart on Rules of Obligation, 45 
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 341, 350–55 (1967). 
 8. Hart was clear on this point when he explained the value of the internal point of view saying 
that, ―[f]or the understanding of [any form of normative social structure] the methodology of the 
empirical sciences is useless . . . .‖ H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 13 
(1983) [hereinafter HART, ESSAYS]. 
 9. For clear statements to that effect see ANDREI MARMOR, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (2011) 
and John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199 (2001). 
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intellectual ancestors, who have often been far more original and 
interesting—exactly because many of them consciously considered the 
question of the connections between a theory of law and a more 
comprehensive explanation of human nature, society, and political 
theory.
10
 
Second, the place of analytic jurisprudence between science and the 
humanities is important for understanding how this approach to explaining 
legal phenomena is currently practiced. In this Article I cannot discuss all 
strands of analytic jurisprudence, but I will focus on two very influential 
jurisprudential traditions, legal positivism and legal realism.
11
 By 
examining the work of prominent legal positivists and legal realists, I hope 
to highlight the way questions about the right relationship between 
jurisprudence, science, and the humanities are implicit in the work of 
many contemporary theorists. One aim of this Article is to demonstrate 
how underneath the visible substantive debates between legal positivists 
and their opponents, and perhaps even more so among legal positivists 
themselves, there is an unacknowledged undercurrent: a debate on the 
right way of doing philosophy. Indeed, I believe this undercurrent is 
sometimes the best explanation of the substantive disagreements. I hope to 
place the jurisprudential debates within the larger enterprise of 
understanding law as a human practice and in this way connect with the 
work of earlier legal philosophers who have had similar aims.  
With respect to legal realism in particular, such an examination is 
worthwhile both for understanding important differences among the legal 
realists and also for seeing their relationships with legal positivism. Brian 
Leiter has recently made the provocative claim that the legal realists are 
best understood as legal positivists. He has tried to show that the two 
approaches, usually thought to be inimical, in fact have a lot in common. I 
will argue, by contrast, that we can better understand the similarities and 
differences between legal positivism and legal realism by looking at their 
views on the place of jurisprudence between science and the humanities. 
 
 
 10. See Dan Priel, Towards Classical Legal Positivism, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1886517. 
 11. My decision to focus on legal positivism and legal realism is not accidental. With regard to 
legal positivism, its connection to analytic jurisprudence cannot be denied. In its early days the term 
―legal positivism‖ was often used interchangeably with analytic jurisprudence. See, e.g., Roscoe 
Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 1937 J. SOC‘Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 17, 25 (contrasting ―analytical 
jurisprudence‖ with natural law). Today, many, perhaps most, contemporary analytic legal 
philosophers are legal positivists. The decision to focus also on the work of the legal realists is based 
on the fact that there has been a great revival of interest in their work, even among legal philosophers 
who in previous generations tended to be rather dismissive of the legal realists‘ work. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This leads to my third reason for engaging in this question—namely, 
the future of jurisprudence. If, as is plausible, jurisprudence is concerned 
with the explanation of a certain aspect of human behavior we call ―law,‖ 
then examining the right methods for explaining human behavior and legal 
behavior within it are clearly relevant—and the position of analytic 
jurisprudence in relation to sciences and the humanities is clearly 
important. I believe there is particular significance in engaging in this 
question now because analytic jurisprudence seems to have been 
marginalized within the legal academy in recent years. I will contend that 
this stems partly from the position many legal philosophers have adopted 
on the right methodology for jurisprudence.  
My argument will develop in three stages. I will begin with an 
examination of the relationship between legal positivism and the 
philosophical doctrine known as positivism. Positivism is, roughly, the 
view that the methods of the natural sciences are the right way to explain 
social phenomena. I consider whether, as some have suggested, legal 
positivism is best understood as the legal offshoot of positivism, or 
whether, as others have argued, positivism and legal positivism share 
nothing but a name.
12
  
In Part II, I will argue that while legal positivism can be associated 
historically with motivations similar to those at the core of positivism, 
legal positivism has in the twentieth century undergone an anti-positivist 
turn, especially due to the enormous influence of H.L.A. Hart‘s work. This 
was not an outright rejection of positivism, but it is crucial for 
understanding many of the central themes within contemporary legal 
philosophy in general and legal positivism in particular. 
In Part III, I will consider the work of the legal realists. Much of their 
work is marked by a conscious attempt to overcome the limitations of 
traditional legal methods by adopting what resembles a positivist outlook. 
I consider whether this provides a basis for tying legal realism with legal 
positivism. With the aid of the preceding discussion, I offer a complicated 
answer. What many legal realists said seems to have strong ties with pre-
twentieth century legal positivism, but not (contrary to Leiter‘s view) with 
its more recent incarnations.The historical discussion in Parts I, II, and III 
helps situate and clarify much of the work done in jurisprudence today. 
 In Part IV, I will present attempts to find a viable middle-ground 
between what is perceived to be the excesses of positivism and the ―soft‖ 
 
 
 12. A note on terminology: the term ―positivism‖ is often used as convenient shorthand for legal 
positivism. In this Article, for obvious reasons, it does not.  
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methods of the humanities. I argue that this resting point is unstable, but 
that turning away from it may come at a high price: legal philosophy 
seems able to retain a unique role for itself exactly because it can maintain 
this midway position. A firm shift toward either a more scientific approach 
or a more humanistic approach seems to lead to something that is no 
longer recognizably a philosophical enterprise. That would suggest that 
legal philosophy is doomed whether it keeps its methodological 
foundations or it changes them. I conclude by offering some suggestions 
as to what this seemingly difficult result may mean for the future of legal 
philosophy. In particular, I suggest that there may still be some midway 
position that legal philosophers could adopt, but it is very different from 
the one presupposed in most contemporary jurisprudential work. 
I. WHAT IS POSITIVISM? 
A. The Varieties of Positivism 
Consider the following two passages: 
When legal positivists are labeled simply as ―positivists,‖ or it is 
otherwise insinuated that they tend to share the broader 
philosophical positions of e.g. Comte or Ayer—beware! It is usually 
the pot calling the kettle black.
13 
Legal positivists . . . share with all other philosophers who claim the 
―positivist‖ label (in philosophy of science, epistemology, and 
elsewhere) a commitment to the idea that the phenomena 
comprising the domain at issue (for example, law, science) must be 
accessible to the human mind. This admittedly vague commitment 
does little to convey the richness of positivism as a general 
philosophical position, but it serves to indicate that the label, though 
acquiring a very special meaning in legal philosophy, is not utterly 
discontinuous with its use elsewhere in the philosophical tradition.
14
 
 
 
 13. Gardner, supra note 9, at 204 n.10; accord RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 20 n.31 (1990); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, DOING AUSTIN JUSTICE: THE RECEPTION OF 
JOHN AUSTIN‘S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 238 n.10 (2005) (―Comtean 
positivism . . . has little or nothing to do with legal positivism.‖); James Allan, Positively Fabulous: 
Why It Is Good to Be a Legal Positivist, 10 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 231, 231 n.1 (1997) (using the term 
positivism is ―in no way . . . meant to signify any acceptance of the philosophical doctrine known as 
‗logical positivism‘ as expounded by thinkers such as Hans Reichenbech, Rudolf Carnap and A.J. 
Ayer.‖). 
 14. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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These two quotations written by self-identified legal positivists originate 
from different articles published within five years of each other. The 
authors wrote these articles to dispel myths and present to an often 
misinformed and confused world what—before all the differences, 
factions, and disagreements that exist among legal positivists—the core of 
legal positivism is. And, still, despite the qualifications in the second 
passage, they reach very different conclusions on what would seem a 
fundamental point—whether legal positivism has any family relation to 
positivism. Yet in neither essay is the question of the relationship between 
positivism and legal positivism pursued. Nor is it examined by many other 
legal theorists who have expressed a view on the relationship (or lack 
thereof) between the two. 
Who is right in this debate? As is often the case in such matters, the 
answer is ―it depends.‖ The problem with assessing these statements is 
that both ―positivism‖ and ―legal positivism‖ have meant different things 
to different people at different times. In its narrowest sense, ―positivism‖ 
refers to the views of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who coined the term 
in his Cours de philosophie positive, published in 1830. Comte had little 
influence on the major figures associated with ―classical‖ legal 
positivism—surely not on Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), who had been 
dead long before Comte was born, or on Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), 
many of whose active years also preceded Comte. There is also little 
evidence of Comte‘s influence on his contemporary John Austin (1790–
1859),
15
 or on any major twentieth century legal positivist.
16
 At least in
 
 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Similar claims are found in MORTON 
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 210 (1992) (―[T]here is a close family relationship between legal, logical, and ethical 
positivism . . . .‖); Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Debating with Natural Law: The Emergence of 
Legal Positivism, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 90, 90–91 (James Penner et al. eds., 2002) (drawing links between legal positivism and 
other kinds of positivism); Tom D. Campbell, The Point of Legal Positivism, 9 KING‘S C. L.J. 63, 72 
(1998) (―there are close ties between legal positivism and the empiricist strand of logical positivism 
. . . .‖); Robert C.L. Moffat, The Perils of Positivism or Lon Fuller‘s Lesson on Looking at Law: 
Neither Science Nor Mystery—Merely Method, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 295, 308 (1987) (stating 
that the links between positivism and legal positivism ―appear to be strong‖); cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT‘L L. 260, 261–63 (1940). 
 15. Austin actually knew Comte, and held him in high regard. See RUMBLE, supra note 13, at 
238 n.10. But there is no indication that he was influenced by Comte‘s ideas.  
 16. There is an intriguing possibility in John Stuart Mill. While not usually considered among the 
ranks of the legal positivists, never having written much on law (see STEFAN COLLINI, PUBLIC 
MORALISTS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN BRITAIN 1830–1930, at 256–57 
(1991)), Mill wrote two highly favorable reviews on John Austin‘s work. See John Stuart Mill, 
Austin‘s Lectures on Jurisprudence, in 21 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 53 (1984) 
[hereinafter Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence]; id. at 167. Mill also wrote extensively on Comte. See John 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss2/2
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Anglophone legal theory, his direct influence, then, seems negligible.
17
 
The term positivism in philosophy is also sometimes used as shorthand 
for the ―logical positivism‖ of Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and other 
members of the ―Vienna Circle,‖ as well as some contemporaneous British 
philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer. It is impossible to describe the ideas 
of the logical positivists in a sentence, but it is fair to say that what 
motivated their work was a rejection of what they perceived to be the 
erroneous concern of philosophers with metaphysics. They perceived two 
kinds of questions: empirical ones, for which only science can provide the 
answer, and questions of meaning, for which the only answers possible 
were tautologies. The logical positivists have argued that many 
philosophers before them were wrong in thinking that there was a third 
domain, that of metaphysical questions. The logical positivists sought to 
show that these metaphysical questions were literally meaningless. And in 
order to replace them, they sought to clarify the logical foundations of 
scientific and linguistic inquiry. Once this had been achieved, they 
believed, there would be no more role for philosophical inquiry.  
Here, too, it is hard to find a real connection between the concerns and 
ideas of the logical positivists and that of the legal positivists. In fact, there 
are good reasons for thinking that the best known legal positivists of the 
twentieth century have been opposed to it. In Nicola Lacey‘s biography of 
H.L.A. Hart, she quotes a letter, written by Hart to his wife, in which he 
harshly criticizes Ayer‘s book, Language, Truth, and Logic, as staunch a 
defense of logical positivism as one could possibly find.
18
  
 
 
Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL, 
supra, at 261 (1969) [hereinafter Mill, Auguste Comte and Povitism). However, as far as I could find, 
there is no indication that Mill has drawn a link between Austin and Comte. Two points are worth 
noting here. First, Austin never uses the term ―positivism‖ or ―legal positivism‖ to describe his views; 
second and more important, as I will argue below, Austin may have been the first of the theorists 
associated with legal positivism to break its links with positivist ideas. See text accompanying infra 
notes 86–87 . It thus may not be surprising that Mill did not see any important connection between the 
two. By contrast, Mill did say, although he did not discuss the matter at any length, that ideas similar 
to Comte‘s positivism ―formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of Bentham.‖ Mill, 
Auguste Comte and Povitism, supra at 267. This is consistent with my claim below that in Bentham‘s 
work there are obvious links between his positivism and his legal positivism. See text accompanying 
infra notes 68–70. 
 17. Matters may be different with regard to Francophone jurisprudence. Consider for example 
the suggestion that ―Duguit attempts for the science of law what Auguste Comte attempted for 
philosophy, to emancipate it from theology and metaphysics.‖ W. Jethro Brown, The Jurisprudence of 
M. Duguit, 32 LAW Q. REV. 168, 168 (1916). 
 18. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 35 
(2004); see also Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. & 
SOC‘Y 267, 275 (2005) [hereinafter Hart Interviewed] (―I reacted against Freddy Ayer. . . .‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Another legal theorist who might be thought to provide the link 
between the legal and logical positivism is Hans Kelsen, an Austrian-born 
legal philosopher, who, despite some significant changes in views 
throughout his long career, remained a lifelong legal positivist. Kelsen was 
active in Vienna during the same period that the most prominent and 
influential members of the Vienna Circle developed their ideas. But while 
it is sometimes tentatively suggested that Kelsen‘s views may be related to 
the intellectual milieu in Vienna at the time,
19
 and that some of his 
characterizations of his own approach somewhat resemble ideas defended 
by logical positivists,
20
 I do not think Kelsen could be described as a 
logical positivist.
21
 It would not be surprising to find that the ideas floating 
around this relatively small intellectual community had some influence on 
Kelsen. Indeed, I will, later on, suggest just that. But such a link does not 
amount to an endorsement, on Kelsen‘s part, of the basic tenets of logical 
positivism.
22
 Apart from Kelsen, I do not think there is basis for any 
serious suggestion that legal positivism and logical positivism are related 
in important ways.
23
  
B. The Elements of Positivism 
All this would suggest that propoponents of the view that there is no 
significant connection between positivism and legal positivism are correct. 
But the term ―positivism‖ is used in a broader sense, to describe a position 
with an older provenance than what we find in the work of the logical 
positivists or even that of Auguste Comte, the inventor of the term.
24
 There 
are variations in detail, but in this broader sense positivism stands for a 
 
 
 19. See, e.g., ALLAN JANIK & STEPHEN TOULMIN, WITTGENSTEIN‘S VIENNA 15, 133 (rev. ed. 
1996); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 41 (2d ed. 1986). 
 20. For example, Kelsen described his theory, which he called ―the pure theory of law,‖ as a 
―radically realistic and empirical [science,]‖ and contrasted it with the natural law approach, which 
was ―metaphysics.‖ See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 44, 49 (1941) [hereinafter Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence]; cf. Jes Bjarup, Legal 
Realism or Kelsen Versus Hägerström, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 243, 253–54 (1986). 
 21. See Clemens Jabloner, Kelsen and his Circle: The Viennese Years, 9 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 368, 
378–82 (1998); Stanley L. Paulson, The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914–1945, 25 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 525, 538 & n.77 (2005). 
 22. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the relationship between Kelsen and the logical positivism). 
 23. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 147–48 
(1982) (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 24. For this usage of the term positivism see, for example, Anthony Giddens, Introduction to 
POSITIVISM AND SOCIOLOGY 1, 3–4 (Anthony Giddens ed., 1974). See also DAVID PAPINEAU, FOR 
SCIENCE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1–2, 185 n.1 (1979) (distinguishing different senses of the term 
―positivism‖ among scientists and philosophers of science).  
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combination of methodological and substantive views, which can be 
summarized in the following terms: 
(1) Materialism: the belief that the world consists only of physical 
stuff, and the corresponding denial of the existence of any 
nonphysical material.
25
 Though this is not a matter of logical 
entailment, materialists are often skeptics about values, or, at least, 
about robust versions of moral realism. It is not hard to see why: if 
values are not a separate entity ―out there,‖ then moral and political 
discourse can only make sense if it is translated to measurable 
standards like preference satisfaction, maximization of well-being, 
and so on.  
(2) Scientism: the methodological view according to which 
knowledge should be attained by following scientific methods and 
goals, especially those of the natural sciences. A central aim of the 
scientific method is to provide an objective description and 
explanation of phenomena in the world, one that could be used for 
prediction future events. There is a range of methods for attaining 
this goal (with different scientific disciplines sometimes adopting 
different methods), but one relevant feature they share is the 
insistence on a separation between the person involved in the 
inquiry and her object of inquiry.  
(3) Anti-historicism: Positivists often reject the view that 
understanding how things are today requires consideration of 
particular path-dependent historical routes. In the context of human 
affairs, positivism is the rejection of the value of genealogy or 
narrative as forms of explanation.
26
 
 
 
 25. I use the somewhat dated term ―materialism‖ instead of the more current, and to an extent 
overlapping, terms ―naturalism‖ or ―physicalism.‖ ―Naturalism‖ has been used with such a broad range 
of meanings that using it here is liable to lead to confusion, especially given that in jurisprudential 
contexts natural law theories are sometimes called naturalistic, even though such theories are often the 
exact opposite of what most naturalists mean by the term. ―Physicalism‖ is less ambiguous, but may be 
too strict, and perhaps also a bit anachronistic when used to describe the views of, say, Hobbes. 
However, the distinction between materialism and physicalism is not clear-cut. The definitions of 
materialism in J.J.C. Smart, Materialism, 60 J. PHIL. 651, 651–52 (1963) and in 2 DAVID LEWIS, 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, at x (1986), are very close to what many would nowadays call ―physicalism.‖ 
 26. (2) and (3) may seem at first like different ways of saying the same thing. But this is not the 
case. In fact, some of the natural sciences may not be positivistic in the sense with which I use the term 
here; evolutionary biology is probably the most notable example of a historical science (in biology 
―everything is the way it is because it got that way,‖ as biologist D‘Arcy Thompson is reputed to have 
said). Daniel Dennett, It‘s Not a Bug, It‘s a Feature, 7 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., no. 4, 2000 at 25, 25. 
And as we shall see, many legal philosophers adopt (3) (and (1)) but reject (2). 
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(4) Minimal role for the analysis of language in explanation: The 
earlier points lead rather straightforwardly to giving a minimal role 
to the analysis of language. The primary role of explanation is to 
help in understanding the world by revealing or clarifying the 
fundamentals of physical or metaphysical reality. Existing linguistic 
conventions stand in no privileged position regarding these 
questions. In fact, given the profound ignorance of most language 
speakers to many of the issues calling for explanation, language 
should be treated with mistrust for its potential to mislead. For this 
reason, positivists often argue that scientific explanation should 
strive to abandon natural languages and adopt instead the more 
precise languages of mathematics and logic.
27
 
There are obvious connections between the four elements. Materialism, for 
example, leads naturally to the view that the methods of natural science 
that have been used to explain the material world exhaust the correct 
methods of explanation because there is nothing else to explain. It also 
leads to the view that there is little to be gained from the ―internal‖ 
analysis of language. The combination of (1) and (2) also leads to another 
view often associated with positivism, that the explanation of phenomena 
is best made by breaking them into their constituent elements. Related to 
all of this is the controversial idea of scientific reduction—the view that 
social phenomena are to be explained in the language of biology—which 
itself should be explained in the language of chemistry and ultimately in 
the language of physics.  
Many anti-positivists will not quarrel with any of this so long as what 
is being sought is the explanation of natural phenomena. The difficulty lies 
with the explanation of human action, which many anti-positivists deny 
could be adequately explained (or understood) using the methods of 
science. We can call anti-positivist any view that rejects, in the context of 
human action and behavior, at least one of the four ideas I associated with 
positivism in favor of one of the following:  
(1*) Holism: Human action can be understood only within the 
culture within which it took place. Culture is a set of ideas, 
attitudes, and meanings that affect a person‘s perception of reality in 
a holistic way, and cannot be reduced or broken down to its physical 
ingredients.  
 
 
 27. See A.J. Ayer, Editor‘s Introduction to LOGICAL POSITIVISM 3, 9–10, 24–28 (A.J. Ayer ed., 
1959). On the willingness of logical positivists to challenge linguistic practices, see ROBERT VON 
MISES, POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 332–33 (1951). 
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(2*) Internal understanding: Unlike natural objects that can be 
explained by external observation, the mark of intentional action—
that is, the mark of what makes humans human—is that it depends 
on the particular meaning with which it is taken. Meaning is a 
concept that cannot be understood, let alone explained, by 
observation.
28
 Consequently, the purpose of an explanation of 
human behavior is not prediction of future behavior, but, rather, 
understanding the reasons that brought it about. Since there is no 
way of ―translating‖ reasons for action to causal description, any 
attempt to offer a scientific account of human action is bound to 
fail. 
(3*) Historicism: the view that a true explanation of how things 
currently are will necessarily involve an account of how they 
developed to their current state from their inception, and that any 
explanation that fails to do that is for this reason inadequate. 
(4*) Constitutive role for language and, therefore, a central role for 
the analysis of language in the explanation of human action: On 
some anti-positivist views, the goal of philosophical explanation is 
to provide an account of the way people understand the world, and 
examining the way people use language is the primary means for 
doing so. As such, it is properly considered the object of our 
inquiry. Linguistic usage is not studied to be corrected, but for the 
evidence to be gleaned from it about people‘s understanding. The 
role of explanation on this view is to make sense, or, to use a word 
much loved by anti-positivists, to ―elucidate‖ our linguistic 
usages.
29
 Philosophical inquiry takes the linguistic concepts as 
given and tries to explain, not to challenge, them: ―[Philosophical 
problems] are problems, difficulties, and questions about the 
concepts we use in various fields, and not problems, difficulties, and 
questions which arise within the fields of their use. (A philosophical 
 
 
 28. See Isaiah Berlin, The Divorce Between the Sciences and the Humanities, in AGAINST THE 
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 80, 96 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979) (discussing Vico‘s 
ideas).  
 29. See, e.g., P.F. Strawson, Carnaps‘s Views on Constructed Systems Versus Natural Languages 
in Analytic Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP 503, 509 (Paul Arthur Schipp ed., 
1963) [hereinafter Strawson, Natural Language] (―[T]he elucidation of concepts . . . can coexist with 
perfect mastery of their practical employment. Now this is precisely the need for their philosophical 
elucidation.‖); P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAYS IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS 9 (1959) 
(―Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, 
revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.‖). The similarity between the first 
quote and what Hart says in HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 2–3, is remarkable. 
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problem about mathematics is not a mathematical problem.)‖30 
Attention should be paid to linguistic usage, then, because language 
is not merely evidence of social reality; it is a reflection of it. 
The contrast between (4) and (4*) is particularly helpful in highlighting 
the different intellectual background of the two approaches. The anti-
positivist tries to understand the social ―world‖ constructed by humans 
beyond and outside the physical world, and she argues that the only way to 
understand this constructed world is from ―within‖—that is, by using 
concepts and ideas belonging to this constructed world. Anti-positivists 
thus need not (and usually do not) deny the existence of a physical world 
and that science (or scientific method) are reliable methods for knowing 
what it is. Rather, they contend that there is a separate domain, created by 
thought and language (the exact relationship or priority between the two 
being a matter of much debate) that is transparent to scientific method, and 
as such requires the humanistic methods of judgment and interpretation for 
understanding it. To the positivist, by contrast, the whole point of 
explanation is to put all these social phenomena on par with the 
explanation of other phenomena in the world, and the way to do it is by 
trying to see how such worlds of meaning are possible within a world 
described in materialistic terms. 
C. Positivism and the Separation of ―Is‖ and ―Ought‖ 
Before continuing, we must attend to another idea often associated with 
positivism, one that is sometimes used as a link between positivism and 
legal positivism—the distinction between ―is‖ and ―ought,‖ or between 
fact and value. These two distinctions are not identical, but they are 
interrelated, and insisting on their significance is sometimes taken to be 
the mark of both positivism and legal positivism.
31
 Thus, the defining 
slogan of legal positivism, and what I will here take it to stand for, is that 
―[t]he existence of law is one thing, its merit or demerit is another.‖32 By 
 
 
 30. Strawson, Natural Language, supra note 29, at 515; cf. P.F. Strawson, Two Conceptions of 
Philosophy, in PERSPECTIVES ON QUINE 310 (Robert E. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson ed., 1990). 
Strawson contrasts two approaches to philosophy but concludes that ―[e]ach has validity on its own 
terms.‖ Id. at 318 (emphasis added). Strawson thus seems to turn even the positivist position into a 
linguistic enterprise.  
 31. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 800 n.5 (1993) 
(considering the is/ought distinction as a link between positivism and legal positivism). 
 32. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 
1995). See also Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 52; Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis 
of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 204 (1931) [hereinafter Cohen, Ethical Basis] (―Law is law, 
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contrast, one often finds in the work of legal positivism‘s critics a rejection 
of the possibility of clearly distinguishing between the two. Lon Fuller, for 
example, argued that ―nature does not, as the positivist so often assumes, 
present us with the is and the ought in neatly separated parcels.‖33  
It is not difficult to see why positivists would be attracted to the idea 
that there is a clear distinction between what ought to be the case and what 
is the case. There is a clear path from the four positivist tenets described 
above and the view that, in explaining the world, one should strive, as 
natural scientists do, to understand what exists and distinguish it clearly 
from what is desired or ought to be the case: there is always room for 
criticizing the law, but in order to do that one needs to know what it is 
first. By contrast, those who believe that an account of what things are 
cannot (or should not) be separated from individuals‘ understanding or 
interpretation of events will tend to the view that a clear distinction 
between description of social phenomena and their evaluation is untenable. 
This is so because individuals‘ understandings of what things are will 
always be colored, however imperceptibly, by their judgments of how 
things ought to be.
34
 
But the distinction between ―is‖ and ―ought‖ can also be misleading, 
for it is also sometimes used as determinative of whether there is a 
distinction between factual and evaluative questions. Here, we often see an 
almost complete reversal of positions between positivists and 
nonpositivists. The reason is that positivists are materialists, which means 
that for them there really is only one domain, that of the ―is.‖ 
Consequently, their explanation of normative discourse necessarily gets 
―translated‖ into the factual language of preferences, dispositions, likes or 
dislikes, the sort of stuff that (in principle) could be empirically 
determined. For example, Jeremy Bentham has argued that the basis of all 
his work, the principle of utility, is grounded in empirical fact. As the 
famous opening sentence of his Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation puts it, ―[n]ature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.‖35 A different 
 
 
whether it be good or bad, and only upon the admission of this truism can a meaningful discussion of 
the goodness and badness of law rest‖). 
 33. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 7 (1940); accord RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 147–48 (1985). 
 34. See FULLER, supra note 33, at 7–10. 
 35. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11 
(H.L.A. Hart & J.H. Burns eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1780/89); cf. Cohen, supra note 32, at 202, 
206 (complaining about the absence of ―ethical science‖ (as opposed to the prevalence of ―ethical 
judgment‖) in legal commentary, and arguing for an inquiry that would be grounded in ―judgment[s] 
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positivist strategy involves explaining normative language in terms of 
conditionals (―you ought to do this‖ means ―if you wish to attain such-
and-such goal, do this‖).36 The practical effect of this strategy, too, is to 
eliminate the separate domain of ―ought.‖ 
The result is often quite confusing: Bentham, a positivist, in fact 
insisted on the importance of separating law as it is from law as it ought to 
be, and he heaped criticism on (what he took to be) William Blackstone‘s 
failure to do so. By describing both law and morality as matters of 
(empirical) fact, Bentham was able constantly to elide the distinction 
between law and morality while firmly maintaining the distinction 
between law as it is and law as it ought to be. Similarly, Karl Llewellyn, 
who insisted on the explanatory value of keeping ―is‖ and ―ought‖ 
separate, also considered his views to be an embodiment of natural law 
theory.
37
 By contrast, Ronald Dworkin, who has argued that ―the flat 
distinction between description and evaluation . . . has enfeebled legal 
theory,‖38 has also argued that the domains of fact and value are strictly 
separate and that it is a fundamental error to confuse them.
39
 
There is no inconsistency between these two positions because they 
deal with separate questions: one with the explanation of social 
phenomena; the other, with the metaphysics of morality and other 
evaluative domains. Nonetheless, to avoid possible confusion, I will not 
rely on the distinction between ―is‖ and ―ought‖ as the basis for 
distinguishing positivists (legal or otherwise) from non-positivists. Instead, 
I will only consider the four contrasting headings discussed in the previous 
Part.  
II. POSITIVISM AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
We can now return to whether the legal positivists are best understood 
as positivist or anti-positivists. I will show that there is no simple answer 
 
 
of ethical values whose truth is recognized to be partially dependent upon the accuracy of human 
scientific knowledge . . . .‖). 
 36. See, e.g., VON MISES, supra note 27, at 332 (reducing ―ought‖ statements to conditionals). 
 37. Compare Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236–37 (1931) (stressing the importance of keeping ―is‖ and ―ought‖ apart) and 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—A Realist‘s Critique, in ESSAYS ON 
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89, 98–100 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Legal Tradition], with 
Karl N. Llewellyn, One ―Realist‘s‖ View of Natural Law for Judges, 15 NOTRE DAME LAW. 3, 8 
(1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Natural Law] (―[T]he ultimate legal ideals of any of the writers who 
have been called realists . . . resemble amazingly the type and even the content of the principles of a 
philosopher‘s Natural Law.‖). 
 38. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 148. 
 39. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 76–77 (2006). 
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to this question and that different legal positivists have adopted distinctly 
different views on the matter. 
The term ―positive law‖ is of much older provenance than that of 
―positivism‖ or that of ―legal positivism.‖ The term originated around the 
twelfth century as the opposite of natural law (although the idea of law 
laid down by humans is obviously much older than that). At that time 
―natural law‖ and ―positive law‖ did not represent two competing schools 
of jurisprudence, but rather two kinds of law, the former referring to the 
laws laid down by God, the latter the laws promulgated by human political 
authorities. Only centuries later did some scholars begin to question the 
very idea of natural law and to think that the only law that existed was 
positive law. It was with them that the distinction between legal positivism 
and natural law as two competing theories about law was born.  
The idea of positive law, then, was born independently of positivism 
and is, in fact, much older than the legal theory now called legal 
positivism.
40
 But this leaves open the question, to which I now turn, 
whether the emergence of the theory of legal positivism—that is, the 
rejection of the existence of natural laws—was itself influenced by 
positivist ideas. 
A. Positivist Legal Positivism 
The earliest theorists we now call legal positivists advanced their ideas 
at a time of great political and intellectual transformation. A period of 
changing political structure with the emergence of states as the foremost 
political entities in the international arena, it was the time in which the 
divine right of kings to rule began to be questioned and rudimentary ideas 
of representation as the basis for political legitimacy emerged. It was also 
a period of remarkable advances in the natural sciences. The successes in 
these areas were an inspiration for the first attempts to use similar methods 
to explain humans, both in explaining the body in mechanical terms, and, 
more importantly for our purposes, for explaining social and political 
phenomena. Among the very first to explicitly pursue such an approach 
was Thomas Hobbes.
41
  
 
 
 40. See Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT‘L L. 691, 696–97 
(1957).  
 41. See PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: HOW ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER 1–37 (2004); 
RICHARD PETERS, HOBBES 43 (2d ed. 1967). 
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1. Thomas Hobbes 
Whether Hobbes was a legal positivist is a matter of some 
controversy.
42
 No doubt, if legal positivism is contrasted with natural law, 
then it would seem odd to put on the side of legal positivism a theorist in 
whose work natural laws and natural rights occupy such a prominent 
place. But to think in this way is to impose twentieth century categories on 
a thinker who would have not recognized them.
43
 Part of Hobbes‘s novelty 
consisted in the role he gave natural law within his account. In at least two 
important senses his work can be seen as the starting point for a new 
political tradition. First, with respect to the relationship between 
sovereignty and law-making power, Hobbes insisted (against the view of 
prominent contemporary common lawyers) that the common law is a form 
of delegated power from the sovereign.
44
 Second, Hobbes thought that 
justice is the product of human law, not the pre-existing standard by which 
human law is to be measured.
45
 With these ideas Hobbes charted a new 
direction in both legal and political theory—although to distinguish 
between these two would also be to read him anachronistically—a 
direction that conveys many of the motivations found in the work of later 
legal positivists.  
However we label his ideas, what matters is to see how they are related 
to his positivistic outlook. Hobbes‘s work displays clear adherence to the 
four elements of positivism identified above.
46
 Hobbes was a materialist 
who denied the existence of spirits or any other ―incorporeal beings.‖47 He 
sought to explain not only human action in mechanistic terms, but also our 
mental life, suggesting that our thought, emotions, and feelings of pleasure 
and pain are the result of motions within our body.
48
 His scientism was 
 
 
 42. Compare JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW 33 (1990), George P. Fletcher, The Right and the 
Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 965 (1985) (calling Hobbes ―a seminal positivist‖), and Gardner, 
supra note 9, at 200, with Mark C. Murphy, Was Hobbes a Legal Positivist?, 105 ETHICS 846 (1995), 
Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1211 (2006), and 
David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 LAW & PHIL. 461 (2001). For my 
explanation of the sense in which he was a legal positivist, and that complements the discussion here, 
see Priel, supra note 10. 
 43. See generally Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. 
& THEORY 3 (1969). 
 44. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 186–87 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter HOBBES, LEVIATHAN]. 
 45. Id. at 90 (ch. 13). 
 46. See generally A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES 24–28 (2005).  
 47. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 11–14 (1986). 
 48. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy. The First Section Concerning Body, in 1 THE 
ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 390, 405, 407 (1839) (1655) [hereinafter 
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displayed in his distinction between scientific and non-scientific method. 
The former was based on analysis of the complex in terms of the simpler 
elements,
49
 and was marked by its ability to generate predictions (or 
―knowledge of Consequences,‖ as Hobbes called it).50  
His paradigm for the sort of secure knowledge that science can produce 
was Euclidian geometry, to which he was first introducedat the age of 
forty. Hobbes was reportedly amazed at the way simple axioms can lead in 
a rigorous fashion to conclusions that at first sight seem to bear no relation 
to the premises.
51
 (To accommodate geometry within his conception of 
science grounded in causes and effects Hobbes had to explain that even 
geometry is a mechanical science.
52
) Hobbes sought the same approach for 
his civil science. In his view complex theories were derived from simpler 
ideas, and, as such, were potentially as secure as a proof in geometry. Civil 
science must therefore start with precise definitions, which provide precise 
meaning for the words used and follow them to more complex 
conclusions. It was an explanation that shows that ―the causes of the 
motions of the mind . . . by proceeding in the same way [as in the natural 
sciences], come to the causes and necessity of constituting 
commonwealths.‖53 Hobbes in fact claimed to have been the first to apply 
scientific method to questions of politics, and went as far as to declare 
himself the founder of a new science.
54
  
By contrast, Hobbes considered non-scientific explanation to be based 
on dogma. It is here that words ―have been aboundance coyned by 
Schoolemen, and pusled Philosophers‖; but in reality these words ―are but 
insignificant sounds.‖55 Unlike science, here scholars ―take up maxims 
 
 
Hobbes, Elements] (§§ XXV.1, XXV.11-12); HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 46 (―Life it selfe 
is but Motion . . . .‖) (ch. 6); PETERS, supra note 41, at 129–30. 
 49. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 10 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1647) (―[A] thing is best known from its constituents.‖). 
 50. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 35 (ch. 5); accord Hobbes, Elements, supra note 48, 
at 82 (§ VI.13) (―The end of science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of things‖); cf. 
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC 75 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1994) (1650) (§ XIII.4). 
 51. See A.P. MARTINICH, HOBBES: A BIOGRAPHY 84–85 (1999). Interestingly, Hobbes‘s work 
prior to that period (now largely unread) is of a distinctly humanist flavor. See 3 QUENTIN SKINNER, 
VISISONS OF POLITICS: HOBBES AND CIVIL SCIENCE 38, 65 (2002). 
 52. See Douglas Jesseph, Hobbes and the Method of Natural Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HOBBES 86, 87–88 (Tom Sorell ed., 1996). 
 53. Hobbes, Elements, supra note 48, at 73–74 (§ VI.7). See also id., at 74 (―[T]he principles of 
the politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of the mind . . . .‖). Contra TOM SORELL, HOBBES 
21–24 (1986). 
 54. See M.M. GOLDSMITH, HOBBES‘S SCIENCE OF POLITICS 228–29 (1966).  
 55. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 30 (ch. 4); see also HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 11 
(arguing that for Hobbes ―[l]anguages with different domains do not establish independent worlds‖ 
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from their education, and from the authority of men, or of custom, and 
take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination.‖56 All this could 
not be the basis for true scientific inquiry, which Hobbes thought should 
avoid the historicist narrative style found in humanistic work.
57
 
The extent to which Hobbes thought he could derive his political 
philosophy from natural science is controversial among scholars.
58
 It must 
be remembered, however, that the psychology and biology of his day were 
at a rather primitive stage. Bearing this in mind, it is remarkable how 
much Hobbes invested in trying to find a basis for his political and legal 
theory in what he thought were empirical observations about human 
nature. First and foremost, this is found in his explanation for the need for 
law. In his account of human psychology, people were self-interested 
beings who are motivated by ―a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power 
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death,‖59 and it is for this reason that life 
without an absolute sovereign would be the nightmare of ―warre . . . of 
every man, against every man.‖60 His positivism also informed his view 
that the authority of law does not derive from reason but rather from an act 
of will of the sovereign.
61
 This, for Hobbes, was an empirical observation, 
not a theoretical conclusion. In taking this view, Hobbes was one of the 
first to accept what would become a shibboleth for legal positivism, the 
separation between legality and content, that is, the separation between the 
conditions for something being a law and what that law says. In this, 
Hobbes‘s work clearly displays a strong link between early positivism and 
early legal positivism. 
 
 
and that ―the language of physics . . . can give us a complete description of the events of the 
universe‖). 
 56. HOBBES, supra note 50, at 75 (§ XIII.4) (emphasis omitted). 
 57. Luc Borot, History in Hobbes‘s Thought, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES, supra 
note 52, at 305, 306 (―[Hobbes] had to get rid of whatever sounded like a narrative style to achieve the 
effect of demonstrative science . . . .‖). For the contrast Hobbes drew between historical knowledge 
and scientific knowledge, see also id. at 310–11; PETERS, supra note 41, at 49–50. 
 58. See Noel Malcolm, Hobbes‘s Science of Politics and His Theory of Science, in ASPECTS OF 
HOBBES 146 (2002). 
 59. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 44, at 70 (ch. 11). Hobbes also believed that it is ―[d]esire 
of Praise . . . [which] disposeth to laudable actions . . . .‖ Id. at 71 (ch. 11). 
 60. Id. at 88 (ch. 13). 
 61. ―It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law.‖ THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Joseph Cropsey 
ed., 1971) (1681). 
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2. Jeremy Bentham and John Austin 
It is with Bentham that many scholars find the true, unambiguous 
beginnings of legal positivism.
62
 Though he shared many of his 
methodological presuppositions with Hobbes,
63
 in Bentham‘s account of 
law there was no room for that ―nonsense upon stilts,‖64 natural rights, that 
had such a central role in Hobbes‘s work.  
A theme running through Bentham‘s work is the need to eradicate 
imaginary ―fictions‖ that bedevil thought, and to restate our knowledge on 
firm empirical grounds. This first required finding out what really exists.
65
 
On this question Bentham‘s answer was clear: he was a materialist who 
believed that ―[t]he only objects that really exist are substances—they are 
the only real entities.‖66 Once what exists was established, the question 
was how it should be explained, and, here, as John Stuart Mill observed, 
―Bentham‘s method may be shortly described as the method of detail; of 
treating wholes by separating them into their parts, abstracting by 
resolving them into Things. . . .‖67 
Bentham relies on both this materialist metaphysics and his scientistic 
methodology in his inquiries in the domains of morality and law. When 
talking of Bentham‘s work on the law, the focus is often on his critique of 
 
 
 62. Even this characterization has been questioned. See Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Bentham and 
the Boot-Strappers of Jurisprudence: The Moral Commitments of a Rationalist Legal Positivist, 63 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 346, 353–54 (2004); Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham, The Principle of Utility, and 
Legal Positivism, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 35 (2003) [hereinafter Schofield, Jeremy Bentham]; 
Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart‘s ‗Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence‘, 
1 JURISPRUDENCE 147 (2010). In part, these essays highlight the dangers of anachronism in using 
contemporary categories to describe the views of theorists who would have not recognized them. In 
this case, the interpretive difficulty with regard to Bentham‘s work largely dissipates once we 
understand that, unlike contemporary legal positivists, Bentham was a positivist. As I said above, 
perhaps ironically, positivist legal positivists have had little trouble with acknowledging connections 
between law and morality while insisting on a separation between law as it is and law as it ought to be. 
See the discussion in supra Part I.B. 
 63. On the methodological similarities between Hobbes and Bentham, see GERALD J. POSTEMA, 
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 314 (1986); James E. Crimmins, Bentham and Hobbes: 
An Issue of Influence, 63 J. HIST. IDEAS 677, 679–80 (2002).  
 64. See JEREMEY BENTHAM, Nonsense upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM, 
317, 317 (Philip Schofeild et al. 2002). 
 65. See ROSS HARRISON, BENTHAM 24–46 (1983); PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1–27 (2006) [hereinafter SCHOFIELD, 
UTILITY]. 
 66. Schofield, Jeremy Bentham, supra note 62, at 13 (quoting Jeremy Bentham (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with University College London as the Jeremy Bentham Papers, box lxix at 241)).  
 67. John Stuart Mill, Bentham, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 75, 83 
(Univ. of Toronto Press 1969) (1838) (footnote omitted); accord L.J. HUME, BENTHAM AND 
BUREAUCRACY 59 (1981). 
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the common law for its obscurity, confusion, retroactivity, and much 
more. But important for our purposes is what this attack tells us about 
Bentham‘s philosophical outlook. For example, what Bentham found 
fundamentally wrong in Blackstone‘s work was the place he gave to 
tradition and history, factors that are of no value whatsoever in assessing 
the merit of the law: ―Our business is not with antiquities but with 
Jurisprudence. The past is of no value but by the influence it preserves 
over the present and the future. . . . Let us reflect that our first concern is to 
learn how the things that are in our power ought to be. . . .‖68 But even for 
understanding how things are, there was little room for paying much 
attention to what lawyers said about it. Bentham had little sympathy for 
the view that understanding law required adopting the internal perspective 
of the lawyer because he thought that much of legal discourse was 
fictional: ―[Lawyers] can no more speak at their ease without a fiction in 
their mouth, than Demosthenes without pebbles. Such is the power of 
professional prejudice to deprave the understanding.‖69 For him, the 
typical lawyerly tendency to become enclosed within the web of cross-
referential legal documents that use their ―internal,‖ technical jargon was a 
sure way of obscuring reality, not grasping it. Blackstone‘s attempt of 
rationalizing English law had many faults, but its most fundamental error 
had been his attempt to make sense of the legal realm and to rationalize the 
law from within, without ascertaining first which parts of it reflected 
reality.
70
  
Bentham‘s alternative based law on foundations consistent with his 
metaphysical worldview. As already mentioned, the starting point for his 
ethical theory was the observation that ―[n]ature has placed mankind under 
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.‖71 In this way 
his utilitarian theory was intended to turn a soft area governed by 
subjective prejudices and mere ―unfounded sentiments‖ into an objective, 
quantifiable, and measurable science; in other words, Bentham sought a 
―reformation in the moral [world]‖72 along the same line of methods and 
developments found in the natural world. His goal was that ethics would 
 
 
 68. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT 314 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Athlone Press 1977) (1776) 
[hereinafter BENTHAM, COMMENT] (footnote omitted). 
 69. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). 
 70. See HARRISON, supra note 65, at 32–33; POSTEMA, supra note 63, at 271–72. Bentham 
thought that lawyers adopted these fictions in part because it made their services necessary. See 
SCHOFIELD, UTILITY supra note 65, at 126–28; POSTEMA, supra note 63, at 286. 
 71. BENTHAM, supra note 35, at 11. 
 72. See BENTHAM, COMMENT, supra note 68, at 393 (emphasis omitted). 
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become ―as nearly perfectly demonstrable as mathematics‖ by 
―transferring the science of number to legislation.‖73  
A scientific endeavor of this sort required understanding human nature, 
which is why after outlining his goals at the outset of his Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham turned to an extended 
discussion of intention, motives, pain, pleasure, and other psychological 
phenomena.
74
 Only after clarifying those Bentham turned to morals and 
legislation.
75
  
Another aspect of Bentham‘s work that derives from his positivistic 
outlook was his conception of legal theory, which is thoroughly practical: 
the main purpose of law on this view was to assist in achieving the goal of 
greatest happiness to the greatest number of people,
76
 and he thus 
conceived of jurisprudence as the scientific study of the way to bring 
about this goal in the most rational manner. It is thus conceived as a 
―practical science‖—the science of curing society of its ills.77 To the 
extent that Bentham‘s jurisprudence engaged in ―conceptual‖ questions, he 
did so only as much as he thought necessary for his concern with legal 
reform. But even here he was faithful to his positivist credo: both his 
account of what law is and his explanation of its normativity—the way in 
which law obligates—are thoroughly grounded in observed fact.78  
 
 
 73. MARY P. MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS, 1748–1792, at 269 (1962). She 
adds: 
Throughout his entire life, throughout all the different branches of law, Bentham tried to 
apply mathematics to morals and legislation: in private substantive law, with attempts to find 
money equivalents for pleasures and pains; in procedure, by efforts to fix a scale of the 
probative value of different kinds of evidence; and in private and constitutional law, by 
considering the numbers of people affected as one test of right and wrong. 
Id. at 270. In a book by Bentham entitled Deontology he says: ―The law-giver should be no more 
impassioned than the geometrician. They are both solving problems by sober calculation.‖ 2 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, DEONTOLOGY; OR THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY 19 (John Bowring ed., 1834). Though the 
sentiment is clearly Benthamite, Bentham‘s authorship of much of this manuscript, including this 
sentence, is suspect. See Amnon Goldworth, Editorical Introduction, in JEREMY BENTHAM, 
DEONTOLOGY xi, xxx–xxxiii (Amnon Goldworth ed., 1983).  
 74. HARRISON, supra note 65, at 137–38.  
 75. By contrast, it should not come as a surprise that religion had no place within this enterprise. 
See JAMES E. CRIMMINS, SECULAR UTILITARIANISM: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
RELIGION IN THE THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 98 (1990) (for Bentham ―[w]here religion was 
opposed to utility it was pernicious, where it agreed with it, it was entirely superfluous‖). On 
Bentham‘s religious skepticism see also James E. Crimmins, Bentham on Religion: Atheism and the 
Secular Society, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 95 (1986); J.E. Crimmins, Bentham‘s Religious Radicalism 
Revisited: A Response to Schofield, 22 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 494, 499–500 (2001). 
 76. See SCHOFIELD, UTILITY, supra note 65, at 44–48. 
 77. See MACK, supra note 73, at 262, 264.  
 78. See P.M.S. Hacker, Sanction Theories of Duty, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
(SECOND SERIES) 131, 138 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). 
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Perhaps most interestingly, the accompanying psychological 
methodology he came to adopt was ―external,‖ that is, he sought to explain 
mental life by means of observed phenomena. His reasons for this 
approach combine the familiar difficulty of knowing what goes on in other 
people‘s minds79 with the less familiar (and given what we now know, 
quite prescient) claim that the contents of a person‘s mind are often only 
fuzzily known even to the person herself.
80
 This implies that even 
introspection is an unreliable guide for individuals‘ mental states. 
Bentham‘s alternative was to focus on the measurable effects of the law on 
happiness.
81
 In all this he rejected what has become the hallmark of 
contemporary legal positivism, the ―internal point of view.‖ 
John Austin‘s theory of law is in many respects indebted to Bentham‘s 
ideas—so much so that it is sometimes suggested that Austin had little 
originality and that whatever minor fame he now enjoys is due only to the 
accident of history that his writings on jurisprudence were more available 
(and perhaps slightly more readable) than those of his greater mentor.
82
 
There is some truth to this claim—there is no doubt that Austin was much 
influenced by Bentham—but it obscures their very significant differences. 
I suspect this error is the result of only considering the surface of both 
writers‘ jurisprudence while ignoring the very different philosophical 
foundations on which it was built. These differences have led their legal 
theories in different directions.  
Austin and Bentham‘s intellectual temperaments were utterly different: 
Bentham was a political radical, who tirelessly argued for universal 
suffrage, the separation of church and state, decriminalization of 
homosexual acts, improvements in prison conditions, and many other 
causes decades before they became mainstream; Austin was an arch-
conservative who opposed most of these reforms.
83
 It is perhaps this 
 
 
 79. See MACK, supra note 73, at 231. 
 80. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 372–75 (1824). This is the orthodox view 
among psychologists today. See John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard 
Posner‘s The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1093–94 & n.221 
(2002) (book review).  
 81. See the discussion in SCHOFIELD, UTILITY, supra note 65, at 24–26, 75–77.  
 82. See, e.g., ELIE HALÉVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 483 (Mary Morris 
trans., 1928); cf. DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 10–11 (1984) (suggesting that apart 
from their differences on the divine foundations of morality Bentham‘s ―legal and moral theory is 
otherwise similar to Austin‘s‖). 
 83. It is sometimes suggested that Austin was (like Bentham) a philosophical radical. See, e.g., 
HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 51–52; TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL 
POSITIVISM 4, 74 (1996). But this is a mistake. See Eira Ruben, John Austin‘s Political Pamphlets 
1824–1859, in PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE 20 (Elspeth Attwooll ed., 1977) (demonstrating 
Austin‘s conservatism). 
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difference that accounts for their divergent attitudes to legal theory. In one 
of his early critiques of Blackstone, Bentham distinguished between the 
―expositor,‖ the scholar who described what the law is, and the ―censor,‖ 
who focused on assessing the law.
84
 Bentham was always a censor and 
engaged in theoretical abstract work as necessary groundwork for his 
practical plans for reform. By contrast, Austin envisaged jurisprudence as 
the study of positive law, and much of his work was concerned with an 
analysis and clarification of concepts important for understanding what 
law is. As Mill wrote, Austin saw his task as that of ―[t]he untying of 
intellectual knots.‖85 
It is thus in Austin‘s work that we see a transition from the positivism 
of Hobbes and Bentham to the anti-positivist version of legal positivism 
that became predominant in the twentieth century.
86
 We see an account of 
law grounded in observable fact: law is the empirically observed 
command of the empirically observed sovereign (the sovereign is simply 
the person or group of persons that others are in the habit of obeying but 
does not obey others); and his explanation of the way law creates 
obligations (that is, his explanation of law‘s normativity) is grounded in 
the fact that violation of legal rules is habitually followed by sanctions. 
Methodologically, we can safely ascribe to him a rejection of historicism 
and scientism in his analysis of law,
87
 although he probably has held a less 
extreme view on materialism.
88
  
Crucially, though, in his work we see the birth of what has come to be 
known as ―analytic jurisprudence,‖ the analysis of fundamental legal 
concepts from ―within.‖89 For his work was primarily concerned with the 
 
 
 84. See BENTHAM, COMMENT, supra note 68, at 7–8. 
 85. Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 168. 
 86. One interpreter of Austin‘s work has argued that he is better understood as an ―empiricist‖, a 
view that would be inconsistent with the reading of Austin that I offer in the text. See W.L. MORISON, 
JOHN AUSTIN 146–47, 178, 189 (1982); W.L. Morison, Some Myth about Positivism, 68 YALE L.J. 
212, 223 (1958). But Morison‘s reading of Austin has been trenchantly criticized in ROBERT N. 
MOLES, DEFINITION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF H.L.A. HART AND THE 
POSITIVIST TRADITION 30–37 (1987). 
 87. See Andreas B. Schwarz, John Austin and the German Jurisprudence of His Time, 1 
POLITICA 178, 187–88 (1934); Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 173 (describing 
Austin‘s work as concerned with ―stripping off what belongs to the accidental or historical 
peculiarities‖ of a particular legal system in order to identify ―universal‖ elements of law).  
 88. Unlike Bentham, Austin was a religious believer, and his utilitarianism was not Bentham‘s 
scientific theory; it was the irrefutable claim that God wished people to be happy and that human 
institutions were largely an embodiment of God‘s will. See Philip Schofield, Jeremy Bentham and 
Nineteenth-Century English Jurisprudence, 12 J. LEGAL HIST. 58, 63 (1991). 
 89. On Austin‘s place in the emergence of analytic jurisprudence see Dan Priel, H.L.A. Hart and 
the Invention of Legal Philosophy, 5 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DEL DERECHO 301 
(2011). The resemblance between Austin‘s work and that of twentieth century ordinary language 
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delimitation of the domain of positive law and positive morality from the 
domain of ethics. Once so distinguished, much of his work was dedicated 
to the analysis of concepts like law, sovereignty, command, sanction, 
rights, and duties by focusing on their internal relations, not their 
empirical reality.  
This focus was fertile ground for adoption by twentieth century 
philosophers who were preoccupied with conceptual analysis. Indeed, 
Hart‘s influential critique of Austin‘s work was largely dedicated to 
eradicating the remaining scientific elements Austin had taken from 
Bentham: he rejected the observable account of obligation in favor of an 
alternative that sought to explain it from the internal point of view; and he 
introduced the notion of a ―rule‖ as something whose objective reality 
cannot be reduced to habits or predictions of behavior, or to the feelings of 
certain individuals,
90
 as an alternative to Austin‘s observable command. 
Hart retained, however, Austin‘s focus on the analysis of concepts and 
their internal relations instead of Bentham‘s concern with understanding 
the legal domain as part of a broader account of reality. It matters little 
here whether this critique was based on a misunderstanding of Austin‘s 
work;
91
 what matters is how his work was used as part of a major 
realignment of legal positivism away from its positivist origins.  
3. Alf Ross 
The predominance of Hart‘s work has led to the relative neglect of the 
writings of other legal positivists working around the time he was active. 
One group of scholars, often grouped together as the ―Scandinavian legal 
realists,‖ developed ideas that were very different from Hart‘s in important 
respects. As a result of the little interest in their work, there is a tendency 
to huddle under this banner a diverse group of scholars, even though there 
are important differences between them.
92
 To avoid possible 
misrepresentation and to keep this discussion to reasonable length, I will 
 
 
philosophers like Hart led one commentator to argue that Austin could count as one. See Alan R. 
White, Austin as a Philosophical Analyst, 64 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 379 
(1978); but see Gerard Maher, Analytical Philosophy and Austin‘s Philosophy of Law, 64 ARCHIV FÜR 
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 401 (1978) (challenging this view). 
 90. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 57, 88, 138. 
 91. See MOLES, supra note 86, at 16–30, 42–80 (claiming that Hart misunderstood Austin‘s 
aims). Although Moles makes some important points, I think he overstates his case in his zeal to 
rehabilitate Austin. 
 92. For those differences see Stig Jørgensen, Scandinavian Legal Philosophy, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE 
BEIHEFT 289 (1986); Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Scandinavian Unrealism: Co-Report on Scandinavian 
Legal Philosophy, 9 RECHTSTHEORIE BEIHEFT 305 (1986). 
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only discuss here the work of Alf Ross, a Danish legal theorist, who is 
probably the best known scholar in this group.  
Ross‘s work is important for trying to maintain and amplify the 
connection between positivism and legal positivism and in this way further 
develop the approach found in Bentham‘s work. Indeed, in Ross‘s work 
one finds some of the clearest links between the two views. Legal 
positivism, he said, is not just a substantive thesis about the relation 
between law and morality:  
[It is also] a doctrine pertaining to the theory or methodology of 
legal science. It asserts the possibility of establishing the existence 
and describing the content of the law of a certain country at a 
certain time in purely factual, empirical terms based on the 
observation and interpretation of social facts (human behaviour and 
attitudes).
93
 
For Ross this meant that his ―realist jurisprudence‖ was based on ―the 
desire to understand the cognition of law in conformity with the ideas of 
the nature, problems and method of science as worked out by modern 
empiricist philosophy‖ because ―[t]here is only one world and one 
cognition.‖94 This meant that, just like Bentham, Ross sought to clear the 
discussion from what he took to be meaningless legal talk that ―bear[s] a 
considerable structural resemblance to primitive magic thought concerning 
the invocation of supernatural powers which in turn are converted into 
factual effects.‖95 The magic involved the introduction of ―imaginary 
rights‖ ―between the juristic fact and the legal consequence.‖96  
Ross‘s theory of law rejected all that and represented a conscious effort 
to explain legal phenomena and their normative force in terms of empirical 
facts. He translated the notion of valid law to the empirically testable 
notion of the predicted future behavior of legal officials.
97
 Along similar 
 
 
 93. Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, in 
NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 147, 149 (Stanley L. 
Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Ross, Validity]. 
 94. ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 67 (1959) [hereinafter ROSS, LAW AND JUSTICE]; see also 
id. at 25 (―[Philosophy] is no theory at all, but a method. This method is logical analysis. Philosophy is 
the logic of science, and its subject the language of science.‖). 
 95. See Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 818 (1957). Possibly inspired by Horace Miner, 
Body Ritual among the Nacirema, 58 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 503 (1956), Ross‘s essay started with a 
recounting of the strange traditions of a tribe called Noît-cif (get it?) for the sake of revealing the 
fictional nature of much of legal discourse, and the way in which it could be translated into meaningful 
language by focusing on the legal consequences of legal rules. 
 96. Ross, supra note 95, at 818. 
 97. ROSS, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 39–44; Ross, Validity, supra note 93, at 161. 
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lines he argued that law‘s normativity could not be explained by recourse 
to morality, for morality was nothing but an expression of an individual‘s 
pro- or con-attitude: as he put it ―[t]o invoke justice is the same thing as 
banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one‘s demand 
into an absolute postulate.‖98 Instead, the normativity of law was to be 
explained in empirical terms. While he rejected the idea that the law could 
be explained in purely behavioral terms, he believed the explanation had to 
combine empirical observation of behavior with an investigation into the 
psychological attitudes that accompany legal rule-following.
99
 This may 
sound rather similar to Hart‘s ―internal point of view,‖ but, unlike Hart, 
Ross emphasized the feeling of being bound by a rule, something he took 
to be a measurable fact that distinguishes law from a robber‘s demand.100  
It should be clear from what has already been said that history played a 
minor role in the development of Ross‘s ideas. In his analysis of 
competing theories, he considered whether historical jurisprudence could 
be understood as an attempt at ―empirical legal-sociological theory of the 
dependence of law on the community‖—but concluded that it could not 
because it ―has nothing to do with the causality of nature,‖101 and, as such, 
it was nothing but discredited natural law in disguise.
102
 
4. Hans Kelsen  
We already see that the suggestion that there is no connection between 
positivism and legal positivism is the result of a narrow focus on a small 
group of legal theorists whose views are in no way representative of the 
views of many legal positivists. To conclude this Part it is worth 
considering the unusual work of Hans Kelsen. Though Kelsen spent much 
of his career in the United States, his ideas developed in a philosophical 
environment quite different from what he found in there. Equally 
important, his jurisprudential ideas were rooted in the civil law tradition, 
and are therefore not always easy to translate to common law concepts 
more familiar to most Anglophone legal philosophers.
103
 Moreover, his 
 
 
 98. ROSS, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 274. 
 99. Id. at 37, 73–74; ALF ROSS, DIRECTIVES AND NORMS 87 (1968) (―Not any disagreeable 
reaction is a sanction. The notion of a sanction is intimately connected with the feeling of disapproval. 
A merely external record of behaviour must lead to unacceptable results, by abstracting from the 
meaning of the reaction and its mental background.‖). 
 100. Id. at 93, 99. 
 101. ROSS, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 346. 
 102. Id. at 249–52. 
 103. Cf. Dan Priel, Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?, in THE 
NATURE OF LAW: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (W.J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 
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work often built upon and discussed the work of earlier European scholars 
who are virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. It is probably 
for this reason that his work, which continues to have considerable 
influence to this day in civil law countries, is not as discussed in Anglo-
American circles. Nonetheless, he is widely considered one of the 
twentieth century‘s foremost legal positivists, and has advanced a 
strikingly original version of legal positivism.  
At the same time, Kelsen was also a positivist, and a rather extreme 
one at that. And yet he is in a way an outlier in this group of positivist 
legal positivists, for he reached radically different conclusions than all the 
other legal positivists discussed in this Section. Because of the 
distinctiveness of his view, it is worth discussing it at somewhat greater 
length. Importantly, as I will try to show, Kelsen‘s commitment to 
positivism is crucial for understanding his unusual jurisprudential views.  
Kelsen was clearly a materialist who believed that the rejection of 
―metaphysical dualism‖ came about ―through the advance of empirical 
science,‖ which gives people ―the courage to discard the realm of the 
transcendent.‖104 Gone from this picture is any sense of morality and 
religion beyond that of a cultural attitude of a particular group.
105
 In a 
short but revealing comment on the impact of scientific inquiry on 
questions of value, he said: 
True science . . . cannot but destroy the illusion that judgments of 
value can be derived from cognition of reality or, what amounts to 
the same, that values are immanent in the reality which is the object 
of scientific study. The view that value is immanent in reality is a 
characteristic feature of a metaphysical-religious (and this means 
non-scientific) interpretation of nature and society. It necessarily 
 
 
forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1835982, at 20. 
 104. Hans Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism, in GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 
AND STATE 389, 433 (Wolfgang Herbert Kraus trans., 1945) [hereinafter Kelsen, Natural Law 
Doctrine]. But he immediately expresses a neo-Kantian view inconsistent with logical positivism. See 
id. at 433–34. 
 105. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS 
IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 1, 21 (1957) (―If the history of human thought proves anything, it is the 
futility of the attempt to establish, in the way of rational considerations, an absolutely correct standard 
of human behavior as the only just one . . . . [and that] only relative values are accessible to human 
reason . . . .‖); id. at 20 (―Norms prescribing human behavior can emanate only from human will, not 
from human reason . . . .‖). Another formulation of this idea is his claim that his pure theory cannot 
answer questions about justice, because as ―a science,‖ it cannot answer questions that ―cannot be 
answered scientifically at all,‖ as ―judgment[s] of value [are] determined by emotional factors and 
therefore subjective in character . . . .‖ Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 45. 
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implies the assumption that both are the creation of God as the 
personification of the absolute good.
106
  
This implied that natural law was wrong because it could not survive the 
trial at what Kelsen called the ―tribunal of science.‖107 By contrast, the 
right theory was based on the view that ―positive law is taken solely as a 
human product, and a natural order inaccessible to human cognition is in 
no wise considered as necessary for its justification.‖108  
Kelsen did not deny that it is possible to explain human relations in 
terms of natural science, that is, in causal terms. He himself explained the 
resurgence of natural law theory as the result of the events that took place 
in the early twentieth century and the desire to attain some sense of 
stability that he associated with the absolute order of value presupposed by 
natural law theory.
109
 But none of this had any bearing on an explanation 
of what law actually was. For this end one had to turn to the normative 
science he created.
110
  
His theory was interested in human relations only to the extent that 
they are constituted by law.
111
 The resulting account is a ―closed‖ 
theoretical construct in which, as Kelsen was fond of saying, ―law governs 
its own creation.‖112 This is the idea with which Kelsen also explains how 
Kelsen sought to explain the normativity of law, the sense in which law 
creates obligations. As we have seen, many positivists tried to show that 
there is something in the world that could ground law‘s normativity. But 
Kelsen thought this solution impossible: ―An ‗ought‘ must always be 
deduced from another ‗ought‘; it never follows from a mere ‗is‘.‖113 His 
answer therefore depended on the presupposition of a normative domain. 
Kelsen posited a hierarchical structure in which each norm is validated by 
a norm higher up the normative scale: bylaws validated by statutes, and 
 
 
 106. Hans Kelsen, Science and Politics, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 641, 648 (1951) [hereinafter 
Kelsen, Science and Politics].  
 107. Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, 2 W. POL. Q. 481, 
482–85, 501 (1949) [hereinafter Kelsen, Tribunal of Science]; Kelsen, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra 
note 20, at 47–48. 
 108. Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine, supra note 104, at 435. 
 109. Id. at 445. 
 110. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 75–76 (Max Knight trans., 1970) (2d ed. 1960). For 
this reason Kelsen criticized Comte‘s positivism. See Kelsen, Tribunal of Science, supra note 107, at 
501–02. 
 111. KELSEN, supra note 110, at 70. 
 112. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 63 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Claredon Press 1992) (1934) [hereinafter KELSEN, 
PROBLEMS].  
 113. Hans Kelsen, Value Judgments in the Science of Law, 7 J. SOC. PHIL. & JURIS. 312, 324 
(1942). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES 299 
 
 
 
 
statutes by the constitution. But this structure by itself still misses the 
crucial ingredient that turns words written on a piece of paper into laws 
that have normative force. Kelsen‘s solution to this challenge was to posit 
what he called the ―Basic Norm,‖ which ―allows legal cognition to supply 
a meaningful interpretation of the legal material [and which] ultimately . . . 
guarantees this complex of norms as an order.‖114  
The Basic Norm is an essential part of Kelsen‘s theory, which he called 
the ―pure theory of law.‖ It is pure, among other reasons, because it does 
not try to explain the normativity of law by appeal to any social fact. The 
Basic Norm is a theoretical presupposition necessary to explain the 
normative aspect of law, but the Basic Norm itself is not explained by 
reference to people‘s beliefs that there is a legal norm in existence or their 
feelings of being under obligation. Such beliefs and feelings may exist, but 
these are sociological or psychological facts about individuals (and as such 
a matter of ―is‖) and therefore incapable of explaining the normative 
aspect of law. A scientific approach, which is what Kelsen was seeking, 
can only explain law as a hypothetical presupposition observed by a ―legal 
scientist‖ standing outside the practice.115 The presupposition guarantees 
that the normativity of law is not dependent on—indeed it is oblivious 
to—any empirical fact. As he put it, his work was ―describing human 
behavior; but it does not describe it as it takes place as cause and effect in 
natural reality.‖116 
It follows that for Kelsen there is a fundamental difference between 
natural science and normative science. The former deals exclusively with 
the domain of facts, and its object is the discovery of the laws of nature, 
which are governed by causation; the latter exists purely in the domain of 
norms, a domain that has no room in it for any facts (including no facts 
about beliefs or attitudes) and is governed by a relation Kelsen called 
―imputation.‖117 In the same way that in the domain of facts causation is 
what ties causes and effects, in the normative domain imputation is the 
relation between a norm and what ought to happen, which is different from 
 
 
 114. Kelsen, Natural Law Doctrine, supra note 104, at 406–07. 
 115. Kelsen, Science and Politics, supra note 106, at 650–51. 
 116. Id. at 651. Marmor is thus wrong to say that Kelsen ―clearly recognized‖ the internal point of 
view ―as crucial to any account of a normative system . . . .‖ MARMOR, supra note 9, at 54; id. at 23–
24. The essence of Kelsen‘s pure theory was the rejection of any links with ―psychology and biology, 
. . . ethics and theology.‖ KELSEN, PROBLEMS, supra note 112, at 8. 
 117. KELSEN, supra note 110, at 76, 86. One problem with natural law theories according to 
Kelsen was that they sought to explain law in terms of causation, ―where cause and effect are 
connected by the will of a divine creator.‖ Id. at 77. See generally Hans Kelsen, Causality and 
Imputation, 61 ETHICS 1 (1950). 
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what is likely to happen (as many legal norms are not adequately enforced) 
and from what should happen (as this only reflects a natural fact about 
people‘s preferences).  
All this superficially resembles the work of the logical positivists, but 
in fact it represents an inversion of their ideas.
118
 The logical positivists‘ 
sharp distinction between the domain of science and the domain of 
philosophy looks a bit like Kelsen‘s distinction between the domain of 
empirical investigation on law and the domain of legal norm. But while 
Kelsen seems to have been content with maintaining jurisprudence as the 
separate domain of pure norm, the concern of the logical positivists 
writing on human behavior was with the establishment of a unified science 
in which, ultimately, the complete description of human behavior would 
be ―framed in the spirit of contemporary physics, e.g., a behavioristic 
description.‖119 Within such an account, Kelsen‘s separation between the 
domain of fact and the domain of norm is completely untenable. The 
contrast between the two approaches is evident, for example, in the way 
Otto Neurath, a prominent logical positivist, reacted to Kelsen‘s theory. As 
Neurath put it, Kelsen‘s error was his failure to recognize that within a 
unified science, ethics and jurisprudence ―cannot maintain their 
independence.‖120  
It is this insistence on the independence of jurisprudence‘s that helps 
explain why so many have found Kelsen‘s ideas so unhelpful, and, quite 
frankly, so strange: Kelsen was single-mindedly determined that the task 
of jurisprudence is not to explain law as a social phenomenon. Though he 
shared both his positivism and his legal positivism with many others, his 
understanding of these ideas distinguishes his views from almost all other 
legal theorists, at least within the Anglo-American tradition.  
 
 
 118. This may explain why Alf Ross, who, as we have seen, quite explicitly followed the logical 
positivists in his work on law, called Kelsen a ―quasi-[legal-]positivist.‖ Ross, Validity, supra note 93, 
at 159–60; cf. ALF ROSS, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICISM OF THE DUALISM IN 
LAW 44 (1946). 
 119. Otto Neurath, Sociology and Physicalism, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM, supra note 27, at 282, 286 
(originally published 1931). See generally Michael Friedman, The Re-Evaluation of Logical 
Positivism, 88 J. PHIL. 505 (1991) (outlining the philosophical ideas of the logical positivists and 
rejecting the claim that they sought to explain the foundations of science in logic).  
 120. Neurath, supra note 119, at 309. See also similar comments on Kelsen‘s work in VON MISES, 
supra note 27, at 332, 396 n.2. Interestingly, Neurath also added another bit of criticism that sounds as 
though it could have come from the mouth of any legal realist: ―No special discipline . . . is required to 
test the logical compatibility of the rules for the administration of a hospital. What one wishes to know 
is how the joint operation of certain measures affects the standard of health, so that one may act 
accordingly.‖ Neurath, supra note 119, at 308.  
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B. Anti-Positivist Legal Positivism 
The discussion so far has sought to show that the rise of legal 
positivism is related to the rise of positivism. The two often reflect similar 
underlying attitudes about the world and about the right methods for 
explaining phenomena in it. However, since the second part of the 
nineteenth century, and especially since Hart‘s work in the 1960s, by far 
the more popular strand within legal positivism has been anti-positivistic. 
There can be little doubt that the prominence of this approach was in part a 
reaction to growing suspicion of science and the potential pitfalls of 
applying scientific method to the study of humans. Especially in the period 
following World War II, memory of the pseudoscience used to justify 
Nazi racial laws was still fresh, and fears of nuclear disaster during the 
Cold War years was on many people‘s minds. What made Gustav 
Radbruch cross the lines from legal positivism to natural law,
121
 may have 
also been instrumental to the growing divergence between positivism and 
legal positivism. Moreover, those who did look to the leading scientific 
approach to psychology of that age, behaviorism and Freudian 
psychoanalysis, had good reasons to doubt the validity of both. What is 
now known as the cognitive revolution in psychology was only beginning 
to take shape around that time, and there was not much in the work of 
psychologists that seemed very helpful for understanding the complex 
human interactions one finds in law and morality.
122
 It was thus not 
 
 
 121. Radbruch was a German legal philosopher, who was a legal positivist but switched sides to 
natural law after World War II blaming the prevalence of legal positivist ideas on the little resistance 
among lawyers to Nazi ideology. On Radbruch and his conversion see Lon L. Fuller, American Legal 
Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 481–85 (1954) (book review). On the impact of 
what were perceived to be the scientistic excesses of the legal realists on the demise of legal realism 
see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND 
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 162–72 (1973). 
 122. Psychology at the time was largely dominated by behaviorism and much experimental testing 
seemed focused on observed bodily reaction to external stimuli. See DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE 
SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE 8–9 (2005) (―In the mid-twentieth century, psychologists were much 
more at home discussing rates of eye-blinking than love or joy . . . . Indeed, the folk psychology of 
ordinary conversation . . . was thought of by professionals as simply bad psychology . . . .‖); STEVEN 
PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 84 (1997). This may have made it more difficult to see the relevance 
of psychology to law. The cognitive revolution that took place in the late 1950s has radically changed 
all that. See George A. Miller, The Cognitive Revolution: A Historical Perspective, 7 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCI. 141 (2003). For criticism of Hart for ignoring its impact see John Mikhail, ―Plucking 
the Mask of Mystery from Its Face‖: Jurisprudence and H.L.A. Hart, 95 GEO. L.J. 733, 751–57 (2007) 
(reviewing LACEY, supra note 18). Mikhail expresses puzzlement how Hart, despite his obvious 
interest in language, did not take interest in the breakthroughs in psychology and linguistics that took 
place at the time. Id. at 755. Part of the answer is provided by this essay: Hart was interested in 
language for its role in providing an anti-positivist, humanistic understanding of human action. From 
this perspective cognitive psychology probably seemed not very different from behaviorism. 
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unreasonable to think that science had reached its limits as far as the 
explanation of human behavior was concerned. 
In this Part I examine the methodological foundations of the work of 
the best known legal positivists of this period and argue that their ideas 
must be understood, at least in part, as a reaction to these developments.  
1. H.L.A. Hart 
Hart was a moral skeptic of sorts: his brief excursion into moral 
philosophy in The Concept of Law sought to give a ―natural history‖ of 
morality that showed it to be premised on certain contingent facts, 
minimalist in content and ―positivist‖ in outlook.123 Though he never 
wrote much on the topic, Hart was clearly sympathethic to skeptical 
metaethical views when, later in his life, he had occasion to review three 
books expressing such ideas.
124
 In his jurisprudential work, Hart was 
concerned to challenge theories based in ―obscure metaphysics,‖ and in 
particular he criticized natural law theories for their foundation in ―much 
metaphysics which few could now accept.‖125  
Hart‘s views, then, have some links to positivism. He sought to provide 
an account of law grounded in facts, although his focus was on the facts of 
legal practice, something he thought he could explain without engaging in 
deep metaphysical questions of the sort that explicitly ground the work of 
Hobbes and Bentham. His path to understanding law gave very little place 
to history. It is true that he had a story to tell about the emergence of the 
legal system, but it was more a thought experiment than a historical 
account. Fundamentally, Hart saw his project as an attempt to provide a 
―general‖ description of what makes something into law in all times and 
places,
126
 and this does not sit well with too much attention to the 
contingencies of history. 
 
 
 123. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 191–92; see also Danny Priel, Were the Legal 
Realists Legal Positivists?, 27 LAW & PHIL. 309, 331–32 & n.48 (2008), although I may have 
exaggerated Hart‘s positivism there. 
 124. See H.L.A. Hart, Morality and Reality, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 9 March 1978 (reviewing GILBERT 
HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1977) and J.L. MACKIE, 
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONGS (1977)); H.L.A. Hart, Who Can Tell Right from Wrong?, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 17 July 1986 (reviewing WILLIAMS, ETHICS, supra note 5). 
 125. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 188; id. at 84.  
 126. Id. at 239–44. Early on in the book Hart admitted his account was ―unhistorical.‖ Id. at 17; 
see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. For a critique of the lack of historical sense in this 
approach, see Morton J. Horwitz, ‗Why Is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?‘, 17 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 551 (1997). 
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While Hart was a positivist in these senses, in other respects that have 
proven much more influential he rejected positivism. Hart was, at least for 
a while, a practitioner of ordinary language philosophy, and many of his 
earlier (and still most widely read) works were, to varying degrees, 
committed to its methodology. Frequently maligned these days as an 
attempt to solve metaphysical puzzles by attention to the way people use 
language, ordinary language philosophy is better understood as an attempt 
to offer a humanistic alternative to the scientism of the logical positivists. 
Ultimately, what the ordinary language philosophers sought was an 
affirmation of the validity of separate ―human sciences‖ alongside the 
―natural sciences.‖ And it is this commitment that runs throughout Hart‘s 
work. In a lecture he delivered in 1958 he said that one should avoid 
―disputable philosophy‖ when one could find the answer to one‘s puzzles 
in ―plain speech.‖127 And as late as 1983, when Hart summarized his 
philosophical position in an introduction to a collection of his essays, he 
was still sympathetic to what he called ―linguistic philosophy,‖128 an 
approach that, as von Wright put it, is ―intrinsically disposed against 
positivism.‖129  
The reason for Hart‘s affinity with the ordinary language approach is 
essentially the same reason he was critical of certain aspects of positivism. 
Hart believed that positivism could not adequately explain human 
practices. In the course of discussing the work of Alf Ross he wrote ―there 
is much that is questionable, indeed blinding, in the attempt to force the 
analysis of legal concepts or of any rules into the framework adapted for 
the empirical sciences.‖130 Some twenty-five years later he expressed this 
view even less equivocally, saying that for understanding rule-governed 
human behavior ―the methodology of the empirical sciences is useless.‖131 
Hart‘s doubts about the application of scientific methods to this domain 
extended also to social sciences like sociology or psychology.
132
 Hart 
described his book The Concept of Law as not just an ―essay in analytical 
jurisprudence,‖ but also ―an essay in descriptive sociology.‖133 The reason 
 
 
 127. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 78. 
 128. Id. at 2–4. 
 129. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 9 (1971). 
 130. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 162. 
 131. Id. at 13.  
 132. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, 193, where he rather disparagingly calls 
psychology and sociology ―still young sciences. . . .‖ See also Hart Interviewed, supra note 18, at 289 
(―I was terribly mistrustful of sociology in general. That‘s an Oxford disease. . . .‖); see also Dan Priel, 
Jurisprudence and Psychology, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 77, 79–81 (Maksymilian del 
Mar ed., 2011) (describing a skeptical attitude among Hart and his colleagues towards psychology). 
 133. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at vi. 
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why so many readers found this claim surprising is because there is so 
little in the book that looks like sociology. But I think the phrase captures 
something significant about the book: it represented what Hart thought 
sociology should look like. It was descriptive in the sense that it sought to 
give a politically neutral account of the nature of law, and it was 
sociology, indeed good sociology, exactly because it did not attempt to 
emulate the methods of the natural sciences (external investigation), their 
language (explanation by means of general laws that govern human 
behavior), or their goals (making testable predictions).  
The right approach to sociology had to take seriously the ―internal 
point of view‖:134 free from any obscure metaphysics on the one hand and 
resolutely not following the methodology of the empirical sciences on the 
other, this approach relied on the examination of language. In The Concept 
of Law Hart quoted J.L. Austin‘s explanation of the importance of 
attending to language, that by focusing on language ―we ‗are looking not 
merely at words . . . but at the realities we use words to talk about. We are 
using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the 
phenomena.‘‖135 This sentence is revealing not just of a methodological 
technique. It also gives us a clue as to the aims of such philosophy, which 
are radically different from those set by the positivists: it is not to examine 
which part of legal discourse is fictional and which part is real, but rather 
to explain the social reality constituted by discourse. It follows that 
language is something that by definition cannot be mistaken. Linguistic 
philosophy, in other words, was for Hart sociology properly done. This is 
a decidedly anti-positivistic idea.
136
 
2. Joseph Raz 
Hart‘s ideas on internal explanation have been further developed in a 
more robust and rigorous treatment of practical reasoning in a series of 
influential works written by Joseph Raz in the 1970s and 1980s. Focusing 
on reasons as the central ingredient for understanding rational action 
allowed Raz to largely ignore scientific explanations of action. In this way, 
Raz‘s position is similar to that of Hart, except that Raz was, if anything, 
even more forthright in rejecting the few remnants of positivism that Hart 
 
 
 134. Id. at 88–91.  
 135. Id. at 14 (quoting J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC‘Y 1, 8 
(1956)). The same quote appears also in HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at vi. 
 136. My views on Hart‘s brand of positivism accord with those in Brendan Edgeworth, Legal 
Positivism and the Philosophy of Language: A Critique of H.L.A. Hart‘s ‗Descriptive Sociology‘, 6 
LEGAL STUD. 115, 127–28 (1986). 
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had retained in his work. In the course of discussing Hart‘s work, Raz has 
claimed that its least successful aspects ―resulted from [Hart‘s] adherence 
to naturalism and to empiricist epistemology, and his rejection of 
evaluative objectivity.‖137 For his part, Raz has argued that normativity 
consists in being related to reasons for belief, action, moods and so on,
138
 
and his account of reasons is strongly anti-materialist. Raz has also 
explicitly rejected the positivist perspective that begins with the correct 
metaphysical picture of the world and fits humans and their institutions 
and practices inside it. His opposite view is that ―[m]etaphysical pictures 
are, when useful at all, illuminating summaries of central aspects of our 
practices. They are, in other words, accountable to our practices, rather 
than our practices being accountable to them.‖139 Correspondingly, Raz 
has defended a conception of philosophical inquiry which limits the 
philosopher‘s role to the identification of the necessary features of ―our‖ 
concepts,
140
 and, like Hart, he stresses the importance of understanding 
law from the point of view of those who participate in the practice.
141
 He 
thus adopts what I called holism while rejecting (at least as far as 
philosophical inquiry is concerned) historicism.  
The task of legal philosophy, for Raz, is to clarify from ―within‖ the 
way legal practices play a role in the practical reasoning of individuals, to 
put them in clearer light and to highlight their important features. This 
approach, which seeks to explain human action in terms of practical 
reasoning, presupposes human action‘s ―discontinuity with science.‖142 
Legal philosophy built on these foundations does not seek to challenge the 
human attitudes that constitute legal practices; it ―merely explains the 
concept [of law] that exists independently of it.‖143 Its ultimate aim is to 
help people ―understand themselves.‖144  
Thus, even though Raz‘s emphasis on practical reasoning instead of 
Hart‘s focus on language gives their respective theories somewhat 
 
 
 137. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND 
PRACTICAL REASON 52 (2009) [hereinafter RAZ, BETWEEN].  
 138. JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 67–68 (1999).  
 139. RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 228. 
 140. See id., at 95–96. 
 141. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 170–77 (2d ed. 1990). 
 142. Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115, 132 
(1992). 
 143. RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 85. This is almost identical to Strawson‘s words quoted in 
the text accompanying note 30, supra. 
 144. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND 
POLITICS 237 (rev. ed. 1995). 
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different flavors, what both accept is the distinctness of philosophical 
method and its relative autonomy from science. 
3. Other Legal Positivists 
It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of Hart and Raz on 
contemporary legal philosophy, and especially on legal positivism. The 
ringing endorsement to the ―internal point of view‖ found in the writings 
of contemporary legal philosophers, among both legal positivists and their 
opponents, is proof of the long-lasting influence of Hart‘s anti-scientistic 
approach.
145
 The mainstream view among contemporary legal 
philosophers is that it is the primary task of jurisprudence to give a 
descriptively accurate account of the ―concept‖ or ―nature‖ of law, of what 
the law is, as distinct from what it should be. On what that nature actually 
is these writers have widely divergent views, but in their adoption of the 
basic stance of a description from the internal point of view and in their 
belief in its ability to provide a substantive, general, account of law, they 
seem to adopt the same anti-positivist approach that characterized Hart‘s 
work.  
What is particularly interesting is how this work, which received its 
first reasonably clear articulation in the late 1950s, has been used to 
reinterpret the works of earlier legal philosophers. Hart, for example, 
wrote that one of the things that Bentham and Austin were concerned to 
show was that ―a purely analytical study of legal concepts, a study of the 
meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, was as vital to our 
understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies.‖146 
But, as we have seen, at least with regard to Bentham this is clearly a 
mistake. At the same time, Hart often criticized earlier legal philosophers 
for failing to pay sufficient attention to the way the language of law is 
used and for ignoring the way people think about legal practice.
147
 This 
criticism makes sense only if one assumes that earlier positivists shared 
with him the anti-positivist perspective, which, as we have seen, they did 
not. If this assumption is abandoned, much of Hart‘s critique of earlier 
incarnations of legal positivism can no longer be taken as a glaring 
oversight on part of earlier legal theorists, but rather as a direct implication 
 
 
 145. See, e.g., Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the 
Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 (2006); Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point 
of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the 
Internal Aspect of Rules, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006).  
 146. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 8, at 57. 
 147. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 6, at 36–38, 82–83, 88–89, 102–03, 138. 
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of their positivist outlook. Hart‘s failure to address the methodological 
background of this position renders his criticism of their position rather 
superficial and lacking in theoretical backing. Indeed, if we take Hobbes‘s 
and Bentham‘s positivism seriously, we have reason to think that Hart did 
not really address their views. More generally, we have then reason to 
doubt the traditional story about the development of legal positivism from 
the supposedly simple theory of law offered by Hobbes to the more 
sophisticated accounts found in the work of contemporary legal 
positivists.
148
  
Distinguishing the two strands of legal positivism also allows us to 
assess their fates. Contrary to first impressions one would get from 
examining contemporary work, I believe it is the positivist strand of legal 
positivism that has been a success, whereas the anti-positivist one has been 
a rather dismal failure. True, many today take Hart‘s criticisms of 
positivism to be decisive. But the positivist strand is alive and well, 
outside the narrow confines of analytic legal philosophy. In more and 
more areas, we see the explanatory power of the external point of view, 
especially in the work of legal economists and political scientists who, 
many of them possibly without fully appreciating just how much, have 
been following Bentham‘s lead.149 
By contrast, it is becoming increasingly clear that the attempt to recast 
legal philosophy as the enterprise of describing the ―concept‖ of ―nature‖ 
of law has not been a success. Instead of the internal point of view 
focusing the theorists‘ attention to the important aspects of law, it seems to 
have drawn participants into an increasingly insular debate that has not 
been particularly helpful in helping people understand themselves.
150
  
III. WERE THE LEGAL REALISTS POSITIVISTS? 
So far I have shown how examining the relationship between 
positivism and legal positivism allows us to understand better the different 
views of different legal positivists and the historical development of this 
 
 
 148. See Priel, supra note 10, for my attempt to a brief retelling of the emergence of contemporary 
legal positivism from the rather different views of Hobbes and Bentham; cf. James Boyle, Thomas 
Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 408–19 (1987).  
 149. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Bentham‘s Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, 51 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 425 (1998). 
 150. For my detailed arguments as to why this approach is indefensible see Danny Priel, The 
Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy, 27 LAW & PHIL. 643 (2008); Dan Priel, 
Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence, 29 LAW & PHIL. 633 (2010).  
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idea. But such concerns were not confined only to analytic legal 
philosophers. Rather, it is a matter of concern for any theorist concerned 
with the explanation of human behavior. I wish to demonstrate this claim 
by examining the work of another group of legal theorists, the legal 
realists, by showing how similar concerns and tensions are found in their 
work. A further reason for focusing on their work in this context is Brian 
Leiter‘s claim that the legal realists are best understood both as 
―naturalists‖ (which roughly corresponds to what I called positivists) and 
as legal positivists.
151
 Given what I have said so far, we must ask in 
response: ―which legal positivists?‖ As we shall see, there are in fact two 
camps among the legal realists—one positivist, the other anti-positivist. I 
will then argue that, though the positivist strand of legal positivism has 
obvious links with the legal positivism of Bentham, it is hard to find 
important links between it and contemporary legal positivism. This should 
not be very surprising when considered alongside my claim that 
contemporary legal positivists are anti-positivist; but I will then argue that 
even the anti-positivist strand of legal realism bears no important 
connections with contemporary legal positivism. 
A. Positivist Legal Realists 
Walter Wheeler Cook, Underhill Moore, Hessel Yntema, and Herman 
Oliphant are among the best known realists, and they all believed that (to 
use Llewellyn‘s phrase) the ―next step‖ in legal scholarship is to adopt the 
method of the social sciences, which themselves should follow the steps of 
the natural sciences.
152
 Cook was a self-styled behaviorist who ―proposed, 
instead of following the a priori method, to adopt the procedure which has 
proved so fruitful in other fields of science, viz. to observe concrete 
phenomena first and to form generalizations afterwards.‖153 Similarly, 
 
 
 151. Leiter advanced this view in a series of articles now mostly collected in BRIAN LEITER, 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY (2007). For my earlier doubts about this claim see Priel, supra note 123. The discussion 
in the text below accompanies and amplifies this article, although the arguments are different. Whereas 
in my previous discussion I focused on the substantive philosophical views of legal positivists and 
legal realists, here the treatment focuses more on the legal realists‘ and legal positivists‘ 
methodological presuppositions. 
 152. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–60, at 20 (1986). 
 153. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 
457, 460 (1924); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, The Present Status of the ―Lack of Mutuality‖ Rule, 
36 YALE L.J. 897, 897–900 (1927); cf. Walter Wheeler Cook, A Scientific Approach to the Study of 
Law, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HONOR OF WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY 201 (James 
Mabry Mathews & James Hart eds., 1937) (demonstrating by a series of analogies to scientific inquiry 
how the law might be improved) . 
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Underhill Moore began one of his articles writing that it ―lies within the 
province of jurisprudence‖ but also ―within the field of behavioristic 
psychology.‖154 These scholars sought to turn jurisprudential questions 
into psychological ones by adopting the tools of experimental 
psychology.
155
  
Even those less committed to behaviorism have argued that legal 
research should follow the social sciences in aiming to formulate general 
laws, ―asserting invariant, or almost invariant relationships among the 
facts in its specific field,‖156 and that it should adopt the methods of the 
social sciences. Many of the legal realists were unabashed logical 
positivists.
157
 In some of Felix Cohen‘s most influential work, for 
example, he followed the early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the 
logical positivists of the Vienna Circle to argue that many legal concepts 
were ―nonsense,‖ because there was nothing in the world to which they 
referred.
158
  
These attitudes were not confined just to theory. Many legal realists, 
with various degrees of success, tried to both revolutionize the way law is 
studied and taught as well as the way the law is practiced by aligning it 
with the rest of the social sciences.
159
 Their skepticism regarding the role 
of legal rules in the legal decision-making process and their emphasis on 
the influence of factors such as the identities of the parties and the 
biographical background of the judge on the outcome of cases
160
 makes 
 
 
 154. Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal 
Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1943); see also Underhill Moore, Rational Basis for Legal Institutions, 23 
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923). 
 155. Even realists who did not follow the work of the logical positivists suggested experiments to 
examine the working of the courts. See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform, 34 COLUM. 
L. REV. 207, 225 (1934); seealso Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. 
L. REV. 925 (1931). 
 156. Huntington Cairns, Law as a Social Science, 2 PHIL. SCI. 484, 489 (1935); See also EDWARD 
STEVENS ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 319–20 (1935) (―[N]othing could be more seriously 
designed for an eventual reform of the legal institution than a science of jurisprudence which insists 
upon describing law in naturalistic terms.‖). 
 157. See HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 74–75, 79–81 (1941); Felix S. 
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 823–27 
(1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense]; Underhill Moore‘s contribution to MY 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 201, 203–04 (1941) [hereinafter MY 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW]; cf. Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. REV. 
127, 135–39 (1932). 
 158. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 157, passim; see also Cohen, Ethical Basis, 
supra note 32, at 201–02, 203 n.9 (rejecting historicist and evolutionary arguments). 
 159. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE (1995); S.N. Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: The Scientific Wing of American 
Legal Realism (pts. 1 & 2), 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 249 (1979).  
 160. See, for example, Joseph Walter Bingham‘s contribution to MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra 
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sense from a positivist perspective, which gives little weight to legal 
language in understanding reality. Their project was, in other words, an 
attempt to break the closed boundaries of legal discourse and connect it 
with reality. This meant turning the study of law into a social science by 
testing hypotheses about the operation of the law by examining statistical 
evidence. These studies were often the subject of ridicule and criticism to 
future generations,
161
 but whether or not they were successful, they clearly 
reflected a positivist outlook. 
B. Anti-Positivist Legal Realists  
At the same time, there were other famous legal realists who 
emphasized the irrational, intuitive, and emotional aspects in humans‘ 
mental life. Naturally, these realists were critical of attempts to use the 
methods of the empirical sciences for predicting judicial behavior.
162
 To 
the extent that they looked for science, their ―science‖ of choice was 
psychoanalysis, which emphasized the unconscious and irrational in the 
human mind. For proponents of this view this implied the inapplicability 
of traditional scientific methods to human behavior. Jerome Frank, the 
most enthusiastic defender of these ideas, has relied on psychoanalytic 
ideas to describe lawyers‘ attachment to formalism,163 underwent 
psychoanalytic treatment himself, and has even argued that all judges 
should be required to do them same in order for them to recognize their 
own prejudices. In his work, he has argued against the possibility (and 
desirability) of organizing human affairs using law-like generalizations.
164
 
 
 
note 157, at 7, 21–23. Leiter takes this to be the ―core claim‖ of legal realism. See LEITER, supra note 
151, at 21–25.  
 161. ―Students often remember realism from colourful stories about funny men who thought 
judges [sic] decisions depended on ‗hunches‘ and what they had for breakfast, or who thought the best 
way to study law was to sit on park benches counting cars.‖ Stephen Livingstone, Of the Core and the 
Penumbra: H.LA. Hart and American Legal Realism, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ORTHODOXY: 
QUEEN‘S UNIVERSITY ESSAYS ON H.L.A. HART 147, 147 (Philip Leith & Peter Ingram eds., 1988); 
Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 401 (1956) 
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Legal Research]; Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal 
Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 337 (1988).  
 162. See Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1330–33 (1947) (rejecting 
the very idea of ―social science,‖ and the hopes of applying scientific method to the law); see also 
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Glass Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 
254–59 (1931). In return, the positivist legal realists were equally skeptical of these realists‘ ideas. See, 
e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5, 13 (1937). 
 163. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13–21, 69–75 (1930). 
 164. See Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127, 1140–
44 (2010). Frank‘s solution was the cultivation of what he called the ―scientific spirit.‖ FRANK, supra 
note 163, at 98. But he meant by this term the exact opposite of what most do when attempting to 
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Frank thought such an approach to law ignores the uniqueness of an 
irreducibly complex reality, and therefore necessarily leads judges astray. 
He sought to counter the scientific tendencies in law by adopting a 
humanistic perspective that emphasized the unique particularity of 
individual cases.  
The most famous other legal realist to have advanced such a view was 
Joseph Hutcheson, a federal appellate judge, who famously argued that it 
is intuition, whose powers he described in almost mystical terms, that 
guides (and should guide) lawyers in finding the right answer to legal 
questions.
165
  
Benjamin Cardozo also deserves mention here. There is some 
controversy whether he even belongs among the ranks of the legal 
realists,
166
 because he was not generally recognized as a member of the 
group and was skeptical of some of their ideas. Nonetheless, he explicitly 
endorsed the prediction theory of legal rules, the most famous of the legal 
realists‘ slogans,167 and he accepted another familiar realist tenet, the idea 
that for many proposed legal principles one could easily find an opposite 
within the law.
168
 His writings on adjudication emphasized the way 
psychology challenges accounts of adjudication that describe it as the 
application of general rules to particular cases.
169
 For these reasons, his 
writings and approach to adjudication can be treated as another example of 
the anti-positivist strand within legal realism, especially as his writings 
 
 
introduce science into the law. See id. at 96–97. For him, the scientific spirit was an adventurous, free-
wheeling inquiry that he thought was the exact opposite of what he found in most scientific inquiry. 
See Barzun, supra, at 1158–66. 
 165. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Lawyer‘s Law, and the Little, Small Dice, 7 TUL. L. REV. 1 
(1932); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the ―Hunch‖ in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) [hereinafter Hutcheson, Judgment Intuitive]; accord Jerome 
Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 655–56 (1932). 
 166. Compare ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 203, 451, 457–58, 575 (1998) (arguing that 
Cardozo held moderate legal realist views, despite ambivalent views towards the work of the realists) 
with John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1452–53 (1999) (reviewing 
KAUFMAN, supra) (arguing Cardozo was a critic of legal realism).  
 167. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 33–34, 40 (1924); id. at 44 (―We 
shall unite in viewing as law that body of principle and dogma which with a reasonable measure of 
probability may be predicted as the basis for judgment in pending on in future controversies. When the 
prediction reaches a high degree of certainty or assurance, we speak of the law as settled . . . . When 
the prediction does not reach so high a standard, we speak of the law as doubtful or uncertain.‖); id. at 
52.  
 168. Id. at 58–59. See also Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Jurisprudence, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 7 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (offering 
a critical but clearly sympathetic assessment of the ideas of the legal realists). 
 169. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165–77 (1921). 
Id. at 167 (emphasizing the influence on adjudication of ―forces [that] are seldom fully in 
consciousness‖). 
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exerted considerable influence on the legal realists with the anti-positivist 
bent.
170
  
What about the most famous of the legal realists, Karl Llewellyn? 
Llewellyn is not easy to pin down, and, as a representative of this group of 
scholars, his case shows the difficulties with attempts to associate the legal 
realists with a particular view or research methodology. On the one hand, 
he clearly did not endorse Frank‘s more extreme views,171 and in some of 
his writings he clearly thought lawyers could benefit from the input of 
social science for providing data that traditional legal methods would 
completely miss.
172
 But it would be a mistake, I think, to cast him in the 
positivist side,
173
 for he was often skeptical, sometimes even scornful, of 
some of the other legal realists‘ forays into empirical research or jejune 
attempts at introducing scientific methods into legal research.
174
 His 
concern with the more scientifically minded realists was not limited to 
how they conducted their research, and went to the heart of the efforts to 
turn jurisprudence scientific. Llewellyn clearly did not think that value (or 
ought) statements could be reduced to fact (or is) statements,
175
 and in his 
own work he always remained faithful to the traditional methods of the 
law and sought to improve rather than eradicate them. His criticism of 
formalism and lawyers‘ tendency to present law as a system of rules was a 
critique of the way people understood how the common law worked, not a 
critique of the method itself, which throughout his life he largely defended 
by what he thought was a more accurate internal explanation. And 
although he no doubt thought the law had many flaws, he believed it was 
an important institution for reflecting on, working out, and reinforcing the 
values people within a particular community hold.
176
 He was thus one of 
the first, at least within the Anglo-American tradition, to explicitly tie the 
law of a state to its traditions and culture.
177
 Correspondingly, in his 
 
 
 170. For Jerome Frank‘s admiration for Cardozo see KAUFMAN, supra note 166, at 458; see also 
Hutcheson, Judgment Intuitive, supra note 165, at 284–85. 
 171. See K.N. Llewellyn, Legal Illusion, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 85–86 (1931) (reviewing FRANK, 
supra note 163). 
 172. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 1286 (1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Social Sciences]. 
 173. For such a view see, for example, HORWITZ, supra note 14, at 191. 
 174. See Llewellyn, Legal Research, supra note 161, at 400–01; cf. K.N. Llewellyn, The Theory of 
Legal ―Science,‖ 20 N.C. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 22 (1941); K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 36 COLUM. L. 
REV. 505 (1936). 
 175. Compare Llewellyn, Legal Tradition, supra note 37, at 101–03, with Walter Wheeler Cook, 
The Possibilities of Social Study as a Science, in ESSAYS ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
supra note 37, at 27, 37–47. 
 176. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122 (1960).  
 177. See James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn‘s 
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discussion of the impact social science should have on the law he 
emphasized the work of those social theorists who sought to identify the 
social meaning of particular legal institutions.
178
  
C. Positivism, Legal Positivism and Legal Realism 
Brian Leiter has recently called for the adoption of what he termed 
―naturalized jurisprudence,‖ an idea with close ties to positivism. He has 
also argued that the legal realists were early proponents of this approach. 
Though significant for turning legal philosophers‘ attention to the 
significance of the work of the legal realists, Leiter‘s work remains quite 
limited to one twentieth century American movement. The longer 
historical view reveals that what many of the legal realists were interested 
in was exactly in line with what many before them in the history of 
jurisprudence were concerned with, namely to use the best science 
available in their day to explain the law.
179
 As ―science‖ transformed from 
―natural philosophy‖ to become a distinct discipline, its successes, 
prominence, and significance mounted, and jurisprudents began borrowing 
scientific ideas, or, rather, trying to align their subject with advances in 
science and scientific methodology. These ideas have been, more often 
than not, most prominent in the work of writers today associated with the 
legal positivist tradition. It is only around the time of Austin—that is, 
around the time that the social sciences were born—that jurisprudence 
started being associated with legal philosophy. By then, and even more so 
in the decades that followed, jurisprudence became the name for the 
residual domain of what was left after all other theoretical approaches to 
the study of law became independent.  
Against this historical development Anglophone jurisprudence of the 
last fifty years (ironically, in spite of the dominance of legal positivism) 
appears as an aberration. For what is distinctive about it is the almost 
uniform rejection of ties with science, indeed for defining itself and its 
methodology in opposition to the sciences. Leiter‘s project of showing the 
compatibility of legal positivism (and legal philosophy more generally) 
with naturalism is thus reformist only in the present context. When 
 
 
German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987) (describing the origins 
of these ideas in nineteenth century, very anti-scientistic, German romanticism). 
 178. See Llewellyn, Legal Research, supra note 161. 
 179. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST—REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING 44–63 (2010). Tamanaha finds many realist-sounding ideas in the generation or 
two before the emergence of legal realism. My claim is that all those ideas are found at least as early as 
Bentham. See Felix S. Cohen, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149–50 (1933). 
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considered against the longer history of legal theory (which Leiter does 
not discuss), his ideas look much less radical. 
On the other side, Leiter‘s picture of the legal realists as naturalists is 
only partially correct, and arguably fails to capture even the views of Karl 
Llewellyn, the best-known of the legal realists and probably the one with 
the greatest lasting influence. The discussion above also helps identify 
both the basis for and the difficulty with the claim that the legal realists 
were legal positivists. Exactly because the most important defenders of 
contemporary legal positivism have not been positivists, I do not think 
legal realists could be counted as legal positivists in the way that term is 
understood today. This is true of the positivist legal realists and, although 
for different reasons, for the anti-positivist legal realists as well. If we look 
first at how members of these respective groups described their views, we 
find, for example, Hessel Yntema, among the positivist legal realists, 
saying that ―the classification of American legal realism in the category of 
positivism along with Austin, Kelsen, etc., is so superficial as to border on 
the perverse.‖180 If we compare them to Hart and Raz the differences are 
even more pronounced. On the side of anti-positivist group Llewellyn 
expressed affinity to a form of natural law.
181
 And he was not alone. Never 
shy of a dramatic phrase, Jerome Frank said he ―do[es] not understand 
how any decent man today can refuse to adopt, as a basis of modern 
civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law.‖182  
My claim is not based only on the realists‘ self-reports. The emergence 
of legal positivism as an a priori inquiry about the nature of law or as an 
analytic claim about the concept of law (rather than as an empirical 
observation or definitional stipulation, as it is in the work of earlier legal 
positivists) was grounded in a theoretical methodology that was 
diametrically opposed to the view that the final arbiter on all matters is 
scientific method.  
What is more interesting is that, paradoxically, those legal realists who 
were themselves anti-positivists were, if anything, even further from 
contemporary legal positivism. A central tenet of their arguments was the 
rejection of the possibility of giving a clear account of law in terms of 
 
 
 180. Hessel E. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1154, 1164 (1941). As 
Yntema goes on to say, the legal positivist is mostly interested in questions of ―logic and form,‖ 
whereas the legal realists were mostly concerned with the ―function, operation, and consequences or, 
in other words, the substance, of law.‖ Id. 
 181. See the quote from Llewellyn, Natural Law, supra note 37. See also LLEWELLYN, supra note 
176, at 122; cf. K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 207, 211–12 
(1934). 
 182. Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 9, 17 (1949). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES 315 
 
 
 
 
rules. As a result, there can be little doubt that Llewellyn, for example, 
would have found Hart‘s legal positivism unsatisfactory:  
under the traditional approach [to jurisprudence] the bulk of the 
subject matter of law is exhausted when the writer has expressed in 
words what ought to be done, or, if he is a legal ―positivist,‖ when 
he has expressed in words what those rules are which in the state he 
is discussing are officially accepted as laying down what ought to be 
done (―positive law‖).183  
On the other hand, Llewellyn emphasized the extent to which law is not 
exhausted by these legal rules, but is influenced by prevalent attitudes, 
culture, social norms:  
the stuff of official legal rules, official legal concepts, etc., presents 
itself under completely different aspects according to the particular 
craft-job which is concerned. Thus the judge, the counsellor, the 
advocate, the legislator, the policy-shaping administrator, the 
administrative subaltern or private, all see and use the official rule-
stuff differently, and the more detailed study of the different crafts, 
of their craft-skills, -traditions, -ideals, -organization, -morale, 
-recruiting, presses, and presses hard, for attention.
184
 
This is inconsistent with legal positivism not simply because of the view 
that there is more to legal decision making than legal rules. Legal 
positivism of the last fifty years assumed that it is possible and important 
to articulate clearly what separates law from other normative domains.
185
 
But where legal positivists analyzed legal practice through its linguistic 
manifestations (most importantly, legal decisions) and saw there a 
distinction which they thought they could sharpen between the domain of 
―law‖ and other domains which are not law (even if they occasionally 
affect the outcome of legal decisions), the anti-positivist legal realists 
looked into legal practice, peered into their own minds, and could not see 
there any clear distinction between the two. Hutcheson‘s intuitions were a 
combination of legal rules, common sense, social mores, and probably 
 
 
 183. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition, supra note 37, at 95.  
 184. Llewellyn, Social Sciences, supra note 172, at 1298. Llewellyn‘s most serious attempt at an 
inquiry as the one he described in the text was anthropological and was anti-positivistic in nature. See 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN 
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).  
 185. See RAZ, BETWEEN, supra note 137, at 199–200; cf. Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of 
Judicial Decisions (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14/2009, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374608. 
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some of the judge‘s personal prejudices. It was pointless, perhaps even 
meaningless, to try to separate ―the law‖ from all the rest. 
We can summarize this point in the following way: positivist legal 
realists rejected the idea of analyzing law as practical reason because 
accepting it was inconsistent with scientific method. By contrast, those 
realists who were anti-positivists would have found the model of practical 
reason adopted by contemporary legal positivists to be at best incomplete, 
and at worst positively misleading, for it gives the impression that 
adjudication is a much more rationalistic process than they thought it 
actually was. Either way, legal realists would have found the ideas central 
to twentieth century legal positivism highly unsatisfactory.  
IV. WHAT SHOULD LEGAL PHILOSOPHY BECOME?  
I have said before that the anti-positivist stance in recent legal 
positivism has been, in part, a reaction to what may have been perceived 
as the failures or limits of science of human action. With the passage of 
time these worries may have subsided to some degree.
186
 But I think there 
was then, and still is, another reason for philosophers, and particularly 
legal philosophers, to resist the temptations of science. For if the social 
sciences (and perhaps, in the future, cognitive sciences) could explain 
social behavior, the need for legal philosophy, or social philosophy more 
generally, might be put in question. On the positivist picture, philosophy 
has no substantive role in understanding reality, and, in the extreme case 
of the logical positivists, it can only properly deal with tautologies. In this 
picture, philosophers are left with the job of explaining why scientific 
method is the only available method. But even more moderate versions of 
positivism lead to similar conclusions, at least as far as the study of social 
phenomena is concerned. Thus, rejecting such views was necessary 
(although not sufficient) for recognizing the potential for philosophy to 
make a positive contribution to the understanding of law. By adopting an 
anti-positivist methodology, legal philosophers could carve for themselves 
a unique area of inquiry, one that almost by definition was not in danger of 
infiltration by the scientists.  
The Hartian solution to this challenge, probably only partially 
conscious, has been an attempt to mix the goals of science of an 
objectively correct and morally neutral description of law with the 
methods of the humanities—not by resorting to empirical testing of 
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hypotheses, but rather by trying to understand the role law plays in human 
action through introspection. In this way, Hart sought to occupy a 
methodological halfway house that would avoid the pitfalls of positivism 
but which was, he thought, rigorous enough to provide an objective 
description of reality.
187
 It steered clear of both the subjectivity of 
humanistic ―narrative‖ explanation—in which everyone has his or her own 
story and there is no way of telling which is right—and what he 
considered to be the explanatory inadequacy of scientific ―external‖ 
explanation.  
There now seems to be a growing sense among legal philosophers that 
this way of occupying the middle ground is indefensible. Though not 
couched in these terms, two recent and very different books may be read 
as a critique of this view, one urging movement toward the humanities, 
while the other calls for a turn to science. Both take their central point all 
the way to their title. In Legal Norms and Normativity: An Essay in 
Genealogy, Sylvie Delacroix tries to explain how law creates norms. Her 
answer, briefly, is that normativity is the result of day-to-day engagement 
or confrontation with law‘s requirements.188 It is only such ―internal‖ 
engagement with the law that can ―create‖ its sense of obligation. For our 
purposes, it is interesting that Delacroix, in effect, calls for an even more 
anti-positivist stance than Hart‘s and other contemporary legal positivists. 
She does so, first, by rejecting the midway position adopted by many legal 
positivists of the observer who can explain and understand law‘s 
normativity by looking at legal phenomena from the perspective of 
participants. Law is not made up of rules that a person can recite as though 
they apply to her, for such an understanding does not capture the sense in 
which these rules are obligating. The ―dynamic‖ reality of law can only be 
understood by participants who engage with the law. Second, contrary to 
the minimalist role accorded to history in the work of legal positivists like 
Hart and Raz, to historically situate jurisprudential questions is, on 
Delacroix‘s account, the only way to adequately address them. 
Philosophy, on this view, aims to help people make sense of their lives or 
understand themselves, and understand what we are and what we think 
requires knowing more about how we related (intellectually) to our 
ancestors.
189
 The Hartian approach is mistaken because it seeks to describe 
 
 
 187. Cf. Mikhail, supra note 122, at 744–45 (describing Hart‘s tendency to situate his view as a 
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the practice as it is understood by those who are part of it while remaining 
outside the practice itself. Delacroix argues that the only way of 
understanding law‘s normativity is by being seeing it from within.190 
By contrast, Brian Leiter‘s Naturalizing Jurisprudence is a forceful 
appeal to moving jurisprudence in the opposite direction. In Leiter‘s view, 
legal philosophers should adopt materialism, abandon the internal point of 
view, and align jurisprudence explicitly with the sciences. As Leiter puts 
it, his favored approach to jurisprudence is ―‗naturalized‘ because it falls 
into place . . . as a chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociology)‖ 
that will provide ―a descriptive/explanatory account of what input . . . 
produces what output.‖191 More concretely, Leiter has been one of the very 
few legal philosophers to countenance the rejection of the methodological 
assumption that jurisprudence should be conducted from the internal point 
of view, and his examples of what naturalized jurisprudence would look 
like are all drawn from the work of political scientists who study judicial 
behavior by statistical analysis of their voting patterns. As he 
acknowledges, in such studies there is little room for examining judges‘ 
attitudes.
192
  
Both views seem to be united by the implicit recognition that the 
midway position that much twentieth century legal philosophy tried to 
occupy does not exist. By contrast, both can point to examples of 
successful explanations for their favored methodology. On the one hand, 
we often use historical narrative to make sense of much that goes on in our 
lives: such narratives are used to explain the eruption of wars, the causes 
of economic depressions, and the explanation of doctrinal changes in the 
law. More importantly, people often rely on such historical narratives to 
explain the sort of obligations they have toward friends, family, or 
members of their nation. At the same time, they recognize that these 
 
 
DISCIPLINE, supra note 5, at 192–99. Cf. E.M. Adams, The Mission of Philosophy Today, 31 
METAPHILOSOPHY 349, 361 (2000) (advancing an even more radical view according to which 
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SOC. THEORY 343 (2000). This reflects the general difficulty with finding the right methodology for 
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explanations can be difficult for others to fully understand.
193
 The 
explanatory successes of science are widespread and overwhelming, and 
with much more data at their disposal, social scientists are able to reach 
interesting and often counterintuitive findings about human action and 
human nature, even though they are based on purely ―external‖ 
observations. In contrast, it is not easy to find many successful examples 
of explaining social phenomena by means of a priori reflection. 
Interestingly, it may be that both approaches are tenable at the same 
time and illuminating in different ways. But the problem is that the attempt 
to turn philosophy into these different disciplines may leave no role for the 
methods and approaches we traditionally associate with philosophy. 
Delacroix‘s genealogical approach that aims to give philosophy a 
substantive role in ―creating‖ normativity through engagement in the 
issues that lawyers use to explain their subject matter is in danger of 
becoming history
194
 (or in the case of particular legal questions, of 
becoming doctrinal scholarship), and it is unclear whether the positivist 
approach favored by Leiter leaves any work left for legal philosophers 
once all questions of jurisprudence are recast as empirical ones.
195
  
Consider first Leiter‘s claim that ―[p]hilosophers, [adopting the 
naturalistic] approach, are the abstract and reflective branch of empirical 
science, clarifying the contours and extensions of concepts that have been 
vindicated by their role in successful explanation and prediction of 
empirical phenomena.‖196 The problem with this view is that the unique 
role Leiter gives for philosophy appears to be part of all scientific 
explanation: science is never content with merely gathering of 
information. Rather, science is the attempt to organize data in a revealing 
and illuminating way.
197
 In this picture the only substantive role left for the 
philosopher seems to be the one suggested by Daniel Dennett, another 
philosophical naturalist, who said that ―as a philosopher [he is] concerned 
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 196. Id. at 184; accord Brian Leiter, Introduction, in THE FUTURE FOR PHILOSOPHY 1, 3 (Brian 
Leiter ed., 2004). 
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to establish the possibilities (and rebut claims of impossibility)‖ and as 
such he can ―settle for theory sketches instead of full-blown, empirically 
confirmed theories.‖198 No doubt a philosopher (like anyone else) can offer 
her assistance to the scientists and may occasionally be able to offer an 
insight that escaped the scientists, perhaps exactly because she may have 
broader but less technical knowledge on a wide range of issues that the 
specialist scientist may lack.
199
 But for the most part it looks like the 
scientists are perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. Perhaps in the 
area of the mind and brain (Dennett‘s specialty) there is still so much 
unknown that there is real need for imaginative philosophers to establish 
big-picture ―possibilities‖ instead of working on the nuts and bolts, or 
neurons and synapses. But there does not seem to be any mystery of a 
similar kind in law, no serious possibilities or impossibilities to be 
examined. There is only a contingent social practice to be explained using 
the same methods we use for explaining all other phenomena, social or 
otherwise. There may be a need for a ―philosophy‖ to explain the reasons 
for a positivistic inquiry about law; but within this picture it does not look 
as though there are any unique philosophical questions about law. Indeed, 
whatever one thinks of the work Leiter suggested as examples of 
naturalized jurisprudence, one thing is clear: even by a stretch it cannot be 
called ―philosophy,‖ and (leaving terminological foibles aside) it does not 
look like its practitioners are looking for, or are in need of, philosophers to 
assist them in their work. 
The problem, then, is that taking Leiter‘s ideas seriously looks more 
like admitting that legal philosophy has completed its historical role as a 
unique intellectual endeavor. I do not mean this as a reductio against 
Leiter‘s views. I believe this is a real possibility, and it is one that must be 
seriously considered. The archaeology of knowledge is full of the 
decaying remains of disciplines that were gobbled up by others, and it may 
be that jurisprudence (or, more precisely, analytic jurisprudence) belongs 
with them.  
Given these limited prospects for philosophy being able to make a real 
contribution to scientific inquiry, adopting the alternative humanistic 
approach may look more appealing. Consider in this context Bernard 
Williams‘s suggestion that philosophers should abandon their scientistic 
aspirations and think of philosophy as a humanistic discipline, concerned 
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with ―how to make the best sense of ourselves and our activities.‖200 The 
problem is how we move from such programmatic claims to specific 
proposals. Williams‘s examples of humanistic philosophy include 
examples that pay greater concern to history, and a focus on ethical and 
political concepts in which he believes science holds little promise for 
progress. But when he gives an example—―how the modern world and its 
special expectations came to replace the ancien régime,‖ how we came to 
use certain political concepts in place of ones used before
201—it is once 
again no longer clear how much philosophy, as it is practiced today, could 
contribute. Such work is empirical; only the empirical data it relies on are 
historical facts. And it is not as though questions or attempts to answer 
them are in some sense novel. Intelletual historians write on little else.  
Most philosophers lack the requisite knowledge of history to address 
these questions. But the problem is not simply that. Even if we are 
interested in trying to articulate a contemporary ―sense of ourselves‖ about 
which philosophers may be better informed, much of philosophy has 
become, perhaps inevitably, too complex, too esoteric, too far-removed 
from worldly matters to be helpful to most people. As sales figures (if 
nothing else) attest, contemporary fiction, cinema, and news media play a 
far more significant role in all this than the closed circle of 
professionalized philosophy. Exactly because of their sophistication it 
seems that philosophers‘ accounts are not likely to be particularly helpful 
(or accurate) as accounts of our collective self-understanding (if there is 
such a thing).  
V. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? 
We have reached what looks like a rather grim conclusion. The existing 
midway position between science and the humanities is unclear about its 
aims and about its methodology, and the alternatives do not look much 
better. Against the expanding domain of science, legal philosophers have 
adopted, perhaps partly inadvertently, a strategy of narrowing down their 
conception of what counts as belonging in their domain for the sake of 
retaining its independence. As other domains encroached upon its 
province, jurisprudence turned to the question ―what is law?‖ answered by 
a priori reflection as defining its domain because it seemed like the sort of 
question that would not, indeed could not, be taken by any other 
discipline. There was safety in this question, for it meant both that much of 
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the empirical work on law was irrelevant (and therefore could be safely 
ignored), and that the independent existence of jurisprudence so conceived 
could not be challenged by other disciplines.  
Against the challenge from science, the decision to go down this 
conceptual route seems plausible, but in retrospect I think it is quite clear 
now that this approach has achieved very little and that its shortcomings 
are so fundamental that no fine-tuning could salvage it. This conclusion 
seems to be in line with contemporary work on the methodology of legal 
philosophy, which expresses unease about the position and job of legal 
philosophy within other academic legal studies.
202
  
What‘s next, then, for jurisprudence? This may well be a topic for a 
different essay, but here I wish to propose a tentative solution, one that 
tries to maintain something of the idea of jurisprudence standing between 
science and the humanities, but does so in an entirely different way from 
the currently prevalent approach. As we have seen, the current view 
combines a scientific aim of description with a humanistic method of 
inquiry. A more fruitful approach may be the opposite: it would adopt 
aims similar to those of political philosophy by focusing on questions of 
normativity and legitimacy, focusing in particular on the question of the 
legitimacy of law as distinct from the question of the legitimacy of the 
state, but it would be much more cognizant of scientific work, especially 
in the domain of cognitive psychology, and its potential significance to 
answering these questions. This approach could thus maintain the concern 
with the ―internal point of view‖ by examining the role law plays in 
people‘s lives and the way these issues touch on questions of legitimacy 
but adopt an ―external‖ methodology for answering this question.  
There are several important reasons to adopt this approach. One is that 
science can help us achieve greater clarity among conflicting internalist 
accounts of law. For example, there are two familiar understandings of law 
that are both ―internalist‖ in different ways but that seem to be in tension 
with each other. The first is the view that law has its own internal set of 
concepts and ideas. It is the sense of ―thinking like a lawyer‖ that students 
are supposed to learn in law school. The second is the image of the law 
that aims to be comprehensible to all its addressees, lawyers and non-
lawyers alike. So fundamental is this idea is that it makes up one of the 
central meanings of the rule of law. Which of these is more accurate?  
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Scientific method could help in examining whether learning to think 
like a lawyer really does change the way lawyers treat legal problems. 
What matters here is not whether lawyers and non-lawyers use different 
language in dealing with legal problems: no doubt they often do. The 
interesting question is whether these terminological differences reflect a 
deeper way of solving such issues. This is something anyone interested in 
the ―internal‖ or ―legal‖ point of view should be interested in, but it also 
looks like a question on which traditional introspective method is 
singularly incapable of answering. If it turns out that it does, it remains, 
however, an open question to what extent this is a good or a bad feature of 
a legal system.  
I am not sure what would emerge from this. Perhaps the end result 
would amount to a change in the subject, perhaps even something that by 
today‘s standards would no longer be called philosophy. It is clear, 
however, that such change is vital. How exactly it would come about and 
what jurisprudence would look like afterward should be the biggest 
questions on jurisprudents‘ agendas for the near future.  
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